Distributive Preferences and Need-Based Justice in Networks

Project B1 Distributive Preferences and Needs-based Justice in Networks uses a theory-driven experimental approach to study the recognition of needs as legitimate claims in the context of network structures and the consequences thereof on the outcome of bilateral distributional negotiations. Building on sociological network exchange theory, we analyse the effect of network structures, the transparency of structures for the actors involved, the number of possible bilateral agreements, and social preferences of position holders on the observance of needs in distributional agreements. Assuming self-interested, utility-maximizing behaviour, equality in distributional outcomes tends to be generated by balanced power relations and information on the network structure. Unbalanced power networks, however, promote highly skewed distributions in favour of high-power positions. While this general pattern has been supported by repeated experiments, other network experiments, however, reveal systematic deviations from these expectations. In particular, holders of structural power positions tend to act more pro-socially under certain context conditions. The main research question is whether, in contrast to other justice principles, needs-based justice is recognized as a distributive principle in network structures otherwise hostile to redistribution. This result would suggest that needs- based justice principles have a higher potential to legitimize distributions than other principles.

The aim of the DFG Research Group Need-based Justice and Distribution Procedures (FOR 2104) is to contribute experimental evidence to a positive and informed normative theory of need-based justice. The need principle mandates that goods are distributed according to the satisfaction of socially recognized needs. The research group has shown that the reference to needs constitutes a core principle in collective distributional decisions but is applied in different ways. Social exclusion and scope restrictions on the need principle are as possible as various forms of differentiation. The project asks in how far needs are recognized as legitimate in network structures and to what extent they are reflected in the result of bilateral distributive negotiations. The structure influences the possibility to articulate needs and determines the power to enforce own preferences. From the perspective of social exchange theory, the project studies the effect of network structures, their transparency for involved agents, and the social preferences of position holders on the consideration of individual needs in the determination of allocations to network members. The treatments varied the communication structure and the available information in three-nodes networks. In one test arrangement all three network members were able to communicate bilaterally, in the other arrangement a central member could communicate with the other two members, who, in turn, could only communicate with the central member but not with one another. The subjects task was to distribute a collective endowment in bilateral negotiations among the three network members. First, the experimental results substantiate the expectation that, contrary to the assumption of self-regarding utility maximization, subjects do allocate a share to the excluded third player in bilateral negotiations. Second, the findings support the hypothesis that the satisfaction of needs declines with increasing need levels, in particular if the third players need exceeds the equal distribution. Third, knowledge of other players needs determines the allocation of resources, whereby the need level also constitutes a measure of the allocated share and a lower need level implicates a smaller share. Finally, an agents social preferences turned out to strongly affect the willingness to satisfy the needs of an excluded third player.