Spinoza on the Concept of the Human Life Form

In the past decade, there has been an increasing interest in the concept of the (human) life form, in both theoretical and practical philosophy. Moreover, it has often been assumed that thinking of mans properties on the horizon of the notion of a specifically human life form requires an integrative approach to anthropological themes which systematically combines reflection on metaphysical, psychological (cognitive and emotional) and moral perspectives. So far, it was mainly Aristotle or German idealism, especially Hegel, who have been used as historical models for contemporary reflection on this issue. However, while these approaches are both strong candidates for an account that is to integrate perspectives from theoretical and practical philosophy, both rely on strong or even essentialist views of human nature. The question arises whether a conception of the human life form is possible which is independent from metaphysical claims about what humans essentially are. In our project, we suggest developing such an alternative conception using the account proposed by Spinoza in his mature works. Spinoza developed a philosophical approach which also systematically connects theoretical and practical perspectives on human behaviour; at the same time, he strictly avoids any form of anthropomorphic essentialism. This, we think, lays solid ground for a liberal outlook on how human subjects may form their life in view of those inner and outer restrictions that nature imposes on them. Moreover, the attempt at developing a Spinozistic conception of the idea of the human life form may also contribute fruitfully to the discussion of certain pressing questions in Spinoza scholarship (e.g. the role of temporality in the constitution of finite modes; the relation of Spinoza to the Aristotelian heritage; the problem of the coherence between Spinozas metaphysics and his views on freedom). In our project, we shall address this question from three different angles. Deriving from a non- orthodox interpretation of Spinozas metaphysics, we first want to examine the existential limitations to which human beings are subjected and their relevance for the human life form. Second, we want to discuss the impact of nature on human ways of life and the intelligibility of a development of the human life form; doing so we hope to gain new insights into the historical relation between Spinozas views on the physical constitution of human beings and the inherited Aristotelian natural philosophy. Third, we aim at discussing Spinozas views on the problem of justifying norms concerning human ways of life along the lines of his political theorist writings.

The aim of the FWF project 'Spinoza on the Concept of the Human Life-Form: Towards a Non-Essentialist and Ontologically Liberal Account' was to discuss how Spinoza's philosophical approach is motivated by a concern with the human life-form and shaped by his particular views on this issue. Thereby, it addressed a general philosophical question, viz. whether or not the human life form is entirely dependent on metaphysical and physical constraints and to which extent it can be conceptualized independently from metaphysical claims about what humans essentially are. In particular, we focused on the following questions: (1) What is the role of the human perspective in Spinoza's metaphysics and how does it contribute to the idea of reality? 2) How does Spinoza frame the relation between (human) individuals and (human) species, given that he departs from the Aristotelian concept of substantial form, and how does he transform the idea of specific forms? (3) How can the assumption of humans having certain needs, derived from their finite existence, be used to provide a new reconstruction of Spinoza's ethics and political theory which integrates them into a more unified practical philosophy? In discussing these questions, rather than as a term to be detected in Spinoza or a concept to be reconstructed, we considered the idea of humanity and of the human life-form as a motivation in the background of many facets of Spinoza's philosophy. Moreover, addressing these questions required that we explored both the theoretical (metaphysical, epistemological, natural-philosophical) and the practical (political, ethical) aspects of Spinoza's philosophy and took them as essentially related. The project brought about three major results: (1) A first key step consisted in the development of our so-called standpoint-reading on which several basic concepts are indexed to the human standpoint. Based on this reading, we were able to provide new analyses of several tenets and ideas of Spinoza's epistemology, ethics and political theory. (2) Discussing Spinoza's natural philosophy in context, we could show that despite his alliance with the mechanist rejection of Aristotelian substantial forms, his approach allows for the assumption of species-related forms. (3) Among the major results is a new reconstruction of Spinoza's conception of language through the lens of his political theory; its basic claim is that Spinoza's political theory comprehends language through its performative, resp. social and political function and it further shows how language can be constitutive for the understanding of normativity. Results, written in English, French and German, are and will be published in several articles in different journals and collections as well as monographs.