NeRAM: Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks and Mitigations
NeRAM: Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks and Mitigations
Weave: Österreich - Belgien - Deutschland - Luxemburg - Polen - Schweiz - Slowenien - Tschechien
Disciplines
Computer Sciences (100%)
Keywords
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System Security,
Rowhammer,
Software-based Attacks,
Software-based Defenses
Modern computers have several gigabytes of DRAM memory that is used to store basically all data processed by the computer while it is running. DRAM memory itself consists of cells that store the 1`s and 0`s in capacitors - for example, charged for a 1 and discharged for a 0. Manufacturers are constantly increasing the density of chips and thus decreasing the capacitance of these capacitors in order to optimize storage capacity, performance and efficiency . The result is that parasitic effects can occur, such as the Rowhammer effect. With the Rowhammer effect, high-frequency accesses to two DRAM capacitors ensure that an adjacent capacitor loses so much charge that a stored 1 is read as a 0 the next time it is accessed. This seemingly small problem fundamentally undermines system security, since a single bit can decide whether a program has administrator rights or not. The aim of our research project "NeRAM" is to better understand the Rowhammer effect, to investigate countermeasures and to develop new effective countermeasures. To this end, we investigate the extent of the Rowhammer effect using automated frameworks. An important part is to describe yet unknown properties of the Rowhammer effect, especially those arising in different environments, such as the effects of temperature, EM radiation and aging. In addition, we also examine the Rowhammer effect on devices that have not yet been examined in the context of Rowhammer, namely graphics cards. Graphics cards have special GDDR DRAM memory, which we expect to be vulnerable to Rowhammer-based attacks. On this basis, we will finally propose countermeasures against Rowhammer that specifically protect data from the operating system. We will then use prototypes to demonstrate the effectiveness of the countermeasures. NeRAM is a research collaboration between Florian Adamsky (University of Applied Sciences Hof) and Daniel Gruss (Graz University of Technology).
- Technische Universität Graz - 100%
- Florian Adamsky - Germany, international project partner
Research Output
- 5 Citations
- 7 Publications
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2025
Title Verifying DRAM Addressing in Software DOI 10.1007/978-3-032-07894-0_10 Type Book Chapter Author Heckel M Publisher Springer Nature Pages 184-203 -
2025
Title Epistemology of Rowhammer Attacks: Threats to Rowhammer Research Validity DOI 10.1007/978-3-032-07894-0_11 Type Book Chapter Author Heckel M Publisher Springer Nature Pages 204-223 -
2025
Title Zero-Click SnailLoad: From Minimal to No User Interaction DOI 10.1007/978-3-032-07901-5_6 Type Book Chapter Author Gast S Publisher Springer Nature Pages 106-125 -
2025
Title Cohere+Reload: Re-enabling High-Resolution Cache Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-97620-9_11 Type Book Chapter Author Giner L Publisher Springer Nature Pages 191-212 -
2025
Title Fast and Efficient Secure L1 Caches for SMT DOI 10.1007/978-3-032-00627-1_6 Type Book Chapter Author Giner L Publisher Springer Nature Pages 106-126 -
2025
Title Systematic Analysis of Kernel Security Performance and Energy Costs DOI 10.1145/3708821.3736197 Type Conference Proceeding Abstract Author Rauscher F Pages 1676-1689 -
2024
Title Generic and Automated Drive-by GPU Cache Attacks from the Browser DOI 10.1145/3634737.3656283 Type Conference Proceeding Abstract Author Giner L Pages 128-140 Link Publication