Emuna: Rationality and Religious Belief

Is it better to have an irrational religious belief than none at all? If so, then the norms of epistemology, which says that beliefs must be rational, will conflict with the norms of religious faith. This project argues, on the contrary, that epistemic and religious norms are compatible. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, ideal religious faith includes rational belief. To make this case I first develop an account of what rational religious belief amounts to. I criticize and reject five salient accounts of rational religious belief, and present a novel account which draws on the ancient Judeo-Christian notion of faith, emuna.1 Emuna is evidentialist, requiring that religious beliefs be grounded in our beliefs and experiences. Moreover, it bears striking resemblances with accounts of rational scientific belief, which is based on a combination of private theoretical insight and shared evidence, each of which provides important checks and confirmation for the other. I then argue on both philosophical and theological grounds that ideal religious faith is emuna- rational. The philosophical argument says that faith is morally better, ceteris paribus, when the beliefs accompanying it fit our evidence; the reason is that love and trust, two attitudes belonging to faith, are morally better when accompanied by evidence-fitting belief. The theological argument draws on biblical sources, arguing that faith is canonically exhorted on the basis of good reasons. My argument contributes to epistemology, moral psychology, philosophy of religion, and analytic theology. The emuna account provides a unified theory of what it is for religious beliefs to be rational, and why they should be. Emuna is original, but stands on the shoulders of such authors as Stump (2010), Zagzebski (2011), Dougherty (2011a), Hazony (2012), Rea (2009), Pinsent (2012), Plantinga (2000), Swinburne (2005), Mawson (2005), Jäger (2003), Löffler (2006) and Aquinas (1274). My project will yield several journal articles culminating in a book manuscript, Emuna: A New and Ancient Account of Evidence and Religious Belief. The Institute for Christian Philosophy at University of Innsbruck is uniquely suited to host my project. It has a high concentration of internationally renowned experts in epistemology, the philosophy of religion, analytic theology, and moral psychology. It hosts several high-profile international projects in related areas, and has an excellent culture of discussion and camaraderie. I hope also to benefit Innsbruck. My fluency in German and acquaintance with Austrian culture can contribute socially and professionally to the Institute. I have intensive research experience in areas of interest to the faculty, with a recently completed Oxford DPhil dissertation on epistemology, and related projects pending. I have strong working relationships with several Innsbruck faculty members and am enthusiastic to cultivate more.

If there is a God, how can we know this? In the contemporary philosophy of religion, the view is increasingly popular that we need to make a leap of faith that we can and even should believe in God on the basis of insufficient evidence. Against this, I defend the evidentialist claim that God if he exists is best known by respecting our evidence: that is, by attending to information delivered by our interactions with the world. Evidentialism has received a bad rap, on the grounds that it is taken to reduce religious knowledge (if such can be had) to philosophical proofs or empirical data. As a result, it is rejected by religious believers themselves. My evidentialist thesis, by contrast, remains close to the concerns of religious believers themselves: Evidence can be anything that informs us about God his existence, his character and his will for our lives. This includes intellectual considerations but also ones own experiences, ranging from mystical encounters to simple everyday experiences of Gods guidance in ones life, as well as the collective wisdom of religious tradition. One source of evidence about God is routinely overlooked: the opinions of people who do not believe as we do, whether they are the adherents of other religions or the marginalized in our own religious community. This claim might seem surprising, since religious communities tend to regard open disagreement as dangerous. They suppose that the treasures of their faith are better protected by avoiding disagreement. But the avoidance of disagreement runs the risk of immortalizing errors from our own temporally and spatially limited perspective as eternal truths. It also runs the risk of conveying a false view of God, on which God is more interested in blind obedience than in understanding powered by love. Engaging in disagreement, by contrast, challenges us to understand our faith, and thus also Gods character, better and more authentically. So one reason why evidence, including the views of disagreeing interlocutors, is important for faith is that it helps us recognize truths about religion. There are two additional reasons, stemming from the nature of faith itself: trust in God and love for him. Concerning trust, the more we know about a trusted person (that is, the better our evidence is), the more certain we can be that she is trustworthy and the safer we can be in our trust in her. Concerning love: basing our beliefs about a loved one on good evidence (including extensive experience with her) puts us in a position to love her as she is, rather than an idol of our own making. In summary, God when he exists is best known about by way of evidence, including disagreement with those who disagree with us. Faith grounded in evidence is for its part a richer faith, for it permits deeper understanding, more secure trust and more authentic love.