The Formation of the Neo-Kantian Doctrines of Apriority

It is the aim of the project to investigate the formation of the Neo-Kantian systems of philosophy. In the 70s of the last century the concept of apriority became a central task for philosophers who tried to return to Kant, because they faced the problem how to establish a scientific philosophy that is not merely founded on psychological principles. Therefore it shall be investigated how the leaders of the Neo-Kantian movement emancipated themselves from the psychological and physiological starting points of Neo-Kantianism (H. Helmholtz, F. A. Lange), from Schopenhauer`s interpretation of Kantianism, and from the Herbartian psychology ("Völkerpsychologie"). Since the Neo-Kantian movement is a very complex phenomenon, it is intended to analyse and compare not only the doctrines of apriority developed by Hermann Cohen (Marburg School) and Wilhelm Windelband (Badian School), but also the similar endeavours undertaken by Otto Liebmann, Alois Riehl, and Johannes Volkelt.

In the 70s of the nineteenth century the concept of apriority became a central task for the so-called Neo-Kantian philosophers, because they faced the problem how to establish a scientific philosophy that is not merely founded on psychological principles. Since Neo-Kantianism was therefore established as a counter-position against empiristic and positivistic doctrines dissolving philosophy into some kind of psychology (`Psychologismus`) and also as a counter-position against non-scientific metaphysical and speculative reasoning, he distinguishes himself from speculative philosophy (German Idealism) as well, as from Herbart`s `Realism`, Schopenhauer`s metaphysics of Will, Post-Kantian psychology (Fries, Beneke), and from Kant`s genuine doctrine too. By comparing the Kantian and the speculative-idealistic doctrines - the two most elaborated systematic positions - one can understand, why under these circumstances Kantianism turned into a theory of objective values (`Geltungsobjektivismus`): the Neo- Kantians try to eliminate all psychological components of Kant`s architecture of reason, but unlike German Idealism they do not try to reconstruct these components by the means of a speculative logic. Therefore Kant`s architectonic of reason breaks down or rather dwindles into the oft-mentioned `Bewußtsein überhaupt`. This loss is compensated by identifying the `Bewußtsein überhaupt` with a so-called `Normalbewußtsein` (Windelband) or `Kulturbewußtsein` (Cohen), an identification which allows to understand Kantian philosophy as a theory of science and culture. The systematic philosophical claims of Kantianism are maintained in this context by placing the emphasis on the problem of value (`Geltungsfrage`). The problem of value therefore allows to reconstruct the systematic relevant differences between the most prominent Neo-Kantian doctrines. (1) The Marburg School (Hermann Cohen) develops a theory of objective value by identifying pure reason with scientific reasoning and by orientating on the `facts` of science and culture. (2) The Badian School (Wilhelm Windelband) tries to objectivize the claim of the values by constructing a transcendent world of ideas and values. (3) The Realistic Criticism, as represented by Otto Liebmann and Alois Riehl, objectivizes the values themselves by identifying them with reality (Liebmann: `Logik der Thatsachen`).