Franz Brentano´s Epistemology in the Vienna Period

The aims of this project are to investigate Brentano`s epistemological views as these are put forward in his last lecture course on logic (in the 1880s) (EL 80), to provide the reader with a critically edited text of this lecture, to present the importance of Brentano`s contributions to modern epistemology, and to trace the numerous influences that Brentano`s logic lecture had in the early days of Austrian philosophy. In all these respects the project is innovative. It takes into account for the first time essential developments in Brentano`s lectures on logic. It is concerned with specifically epistemological matters, such as the problem of induction, which have hardly received attention in the literature on Brentano. Moreover, the edition will involve the application of the techniques and principles of the internationally accepted Text Encoding Initiative. The unreliable edition of parts of Brentano`s lectures on logic which have appeared in the volume Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, can thus finally be regarded as obsolete. It will be shown why Brentano`s lectures on logic are central in his work and were especially valued by his students (including Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and Anton Marty). Brentano conceives of logic as the art of judgment, i.e., the discipline that aims at correct judgment or knowledge (cognition). For this reason Brentano`s epistemology is primarily to be found in his logic. The topics he treats in logic include thoughts and their expression in language, in particular presentations and judgments (two of the basic classes of mental phenomena). Once Brentano has elaborated on these topics, he discusses various types of cognition, of which there are two main ones: mediate and immediate. As regards mediate cognition, this divides into two kinds: cognition via deduction and cognition via induction. In his treatment of deduction Brentano applies his view that judgments are always existential. Accordingly he develops views of deduction which differ significantly from traditional ones. In his treatment of the remaining type of mediate cognition Brentano makes a connection between probability theory and induction. Since this connection is probably Brentano`s most significant contribution to modern epistemology, it will be given special attention in the proposed study.

The aims of this project are to investigate Brentano`s epistemological views as these are put forward in his last lecture course on logic (in the 1880s) (EL 80), to provide the reader with a critically edited text of this lecture, to present the importance of Brentano`s contributions to modern epistemology, and to trace the numerous influences that Brentano`s logic lecture had in the early days of Austrian philosophy. In all these respects the project is innovative. It takes into account for the first time essential developments in Brentano`s lectures on logic. It is concerned with specifically epistemological matters, such as the problem of induction, which have hardly received attention in the literature on Brentano. Moreover, the edition will involve the application of the techniques and principles of the internationally accepted Text Encoding Initiative. The unreliable edition of parts of Brentano`s lectures on logic which have appeared in the volume Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, can thus finally be regarded as obsolete. It will be shown why Brentano`s lectures on logic are central in his work and were especially valued by his students (including Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and Anton Marty). Brentano conceives of logic as the art of judgment, i.e., the discipline that aims at correct judgment or knowledge (cognition). For this reason Brentano`s epistemology is primarily to be found in his logic. The topics he treats in logic include thoughts and their expression in language, in particular presentations and judgments (two of the basic classes of mental phenomena). Once Brentano has elaborated on these topics, he discusses various types of cognition, of which there are two main ones: mediate and immediate. As regards mediate cognition, this divides into two kinds: cognition via deduction and cognition via induction. In his treatment of deduction Brentano applies his view that judgments are always existential. Accordingly he develops views of deduction which differ significantly from traditional ones. In his treatment of the remaining type of mediate cognition Brentano makes a connection between probability theory and induction. Since this connection is probably Brentano`s most significant contribution to modern epistemology, it will be given special attention in the proposed study.