Joint evolution of indirect reciprocity and voluntary participation

The evolution of cooperation remains a challenging conundrum that attracts broad attention from various scientific disciplines, biology to the social sciences. Game-theoretical studies on the evolution of cooperation have demonstrated that indirect reciprocity and voluntary participation are mechanisms to promote cooperation in the presence of those willing to freeload on others contribution. Indirect reciprocity, on the one hand, is often described as If I helped you, then I will have a good image, and then someone will help me. The evolution of such reciprocal cooperation thus depends on reputation assessment, action options, and interactions structure. Voluntary participation, on the other hand, can simply yet effectively destabilize a state in which all individuals freeload, which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, and pave the way for establishing a state in which all individuals cooperate. Despite enormous game-theoretical efforts to understand the evolution of cooperation, however, only little was known about what happens if one considers the interplay of indirect reciprocity with voluntary participation. We, therefore, propose a project in which the focus of research is the integration of indirect reciprocity based on reputation systems and voluntary participation in social interactions. This project aims to investigate the joint evolution of indirect reciprocity and voluntary participation, in situations relevant to the emergence and maintenance of human cooperation, from a game theoretical perspective. As is well known, if participation is compulsory, cooperative reciprocators hardly can invade the freeloaders equilibrium, unless another supportive mechanism is considered. This is not the case, however, in the project proposed, because it is highly possible that considering voluntary participation leads to a resolution of the emergence problem of indirect reciprocity. Thus, one of the main questions addressed in the proposed project is: what reciprocal strategies are most likely to evolve if participation is voluntary? Then, the question will be extensively investigated, with considering errors, imperfect and private information, punishment, ostracism, structured populations, or reputation-based partner choice. The project presents the first comprehensive research on the joint evolution of indirect reciprocity and voluntary participation. The project is innovative and has not yet been considered. Thus it could be ground-breaking. Because the origins and transitions of reciprocity norms raise important and far- reaching questions, the project can provide rich implications, not limited to the specific research field.