Phenomenal Concepts and Anti-Physicalism

One key-issue in contemporary philosophy of mind is the question if consciousness can be reduced to a physical phenomenon or if it resists a physicalist reduction. The physicalist attempt to reduce consciousness is challenged by anti-physicalist arguments based on the phenomenal aspect of mental states. In recent literature the phenomenal concept strategy is seen as one of the most powerful responses to these anti-physicalist arguments. My project aims at the development of an original theory of phenomenal concepts which shall shed new and important insights on this issue. Furthermore, an analysis of the impact this account has on central issues in the philosophy of mind, like, for example, the vivid debate about narrow mental content and about phenomenal intentionality, lies at the heart of my project. Contrary to most accounts of phenomenal concepts, which are invoked to defend physicalism, the proposed account will strengthen anti-physicalism. In a first step, my argumentation aims at demonstrating the limits of the physicalist phenomenal concept strategy. I will investigate different accounts of phenomenal concepts and elaborate the difficulties these accounts face. A strong focus will lie on the quotational account of phenomenal concepts which has the advantage of positing an intimate link between concept and experience. I will argue that, despite this advantage, a physicalist interpretation of quotational phenomenal concepts cannot explain, for example, Frank Jackson`s knowledge argument adequately. Hence, the first step in my investigations will end with a negative result for the physicalist. In a second step, I will elaborate an innovative and extensive account of phenomenal concepts- labeled the encapsulation account - which borrows a lot from concept-empiricism. Subsequently, I will work out the explanatory power and dualistic consequences of the advocated account In a final step, I will analyze the impact of the encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts for an analysis of mental content and, hence, physicalist treatment of intentional. I will start examining the question if phenomenal concepts being involved in the content of intentional states narrow this content down to an internalist issue. Next, I will analyze if a partly phenomenally constituted mental content has serious consequences for the physicalist treatment of intentional states and, hence, phenomenal concepts extend the dimension of the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Therefore, it will turn out that invoking phenomenal concepts does not only fail in saving physicalism, but rather confronts it with new and extended problems - a challenge, that I regard as broadening the horizon of the contemporary debate and research. Moreover, the expected results of my project might turn out to be particularly useful to the physicalists as well, motivating a new round of responses and leading to an even more sophisticated understanding of these key-issues in the philosophy of mind.

Can consciousness be reduced to physical processes in the brain? Can the subjective feeling of what it is like to smell roses, to see the ocean or to feel the rain on my skin be captured by a physicalist theory of consciousness? The research project aimed at offering a new explanation as to why consciousness resists a physicalist reduction, by analyzing the special way how we think about our own experiences and how we gain knowledge about what they are like. One key-issue in contemporary philosophy of mind is the question whether consciousness is a physical phenomenon or whether the phenomenal, subjective, character of consciousness poses a special problem for a physicalist theory of the mind. In contemporary literature, the so-called phenomenal concept strategy receives a lot of attention. The aim of this strategy is to offer an explanation of the intuition that consciousness is not reducible to physical states. In particular, the strategy has it that when we think about conscious experiences, we do this in terms of what it is like for us to have those experiences. Since we conceptualize experiences in a subjective, phenomenal way, we fail to see how experiences could be identical to objective, physical states. According to this strategy, this intuition is misleading and consciousness in fact just is a physical phenomenon. The research project was divided into four parts. First, I demonstrated that the phenomenal concept strategy fails because none of the existing accounts of phenomenal concepts can explain how we gain knowledge about our own conscious experiences. The second part of the project was constructive. I developed a new theory of phenomenal concepts that has great explanatory power. In particular, it sheds light on the questions of how we acquire concepts of conscious experiences and how those special concepts yield knowledge about what subjective experiences are like. In a third step, I argued that the account of phenomenal concepts that elucidates their cognitive function cannot be utilized to defend a physicalist theory of consciousness. Rather, it implies that conscious experiences are not reducible to physical states. In a final step, I extended the analysis from conscious experiences to conscious cognitive states, such as thinking or judging. In particular, I investigated whether the content of conscious thoughts has also a subjective, phenomenal, component that make conscious cognitive states resist a physicalist reduction as well. The project led to important insights regarding an adequate analysis of the mind. The results encompass new arguments for the irreducibility of both phenomenal experiences and conscious thoughts, thereby confronting a physicalist theory of the mind with new and extended problems. Moreover, the investigation of how we think about experiences led to a more sophisticated understanding of a major debate in analytic philosophy the relation between experiences and concepts. Finally, the analysis of how we gain knowledge about our subjective inner life advances the debate about introspection and selfknowledge that are gathering momentum in contemporary literature.