Theories of judgment belong into the inner realm of theoretical philosophy. The notion of judgment leads into disciplines such as descriptive psychology, ontology and logic, and hence its investigation represents a pivotal area of research. Within the Brentano-School, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) contributed significantly to this topic by separating and exploring both the subjective side of judgment (the intentional experience of judging) as well as its objective side (the "state of affairs" or the "objective"). In the first two chapters of the present publication Meinong`s and Reinach`s lore regarding psychological and object-theoretical aspects of judgment are explicated, compared and evaluated. Within a reconstruction of both positions, the research states as one main result that, in these two areas, Reinach`s and Meinong`s reflection converge in several respects: The psychological description of (the experience of) judging as well as the ontological analysis of the state of affairs clearly show parallels. However, Meinong`s influence on Reinach`s thinking ends when the latter develops his own original train of thought following the framework of Edmund Husserl`s (1859-1938) phenomenology. For the sake of this comparison, Reinach`s critiques of Meinong`s semantic positions as well as of the "Graz" confusion of states of affairs with logical propositions are paradigmatic: In this case Reinach adopts Husserl`s theory of meaning, he develops it, he uses it for its own theory of judgment and, finally, he criticizes Meinong on its basis. With his theoretical strategy Reinach succeeds in elaborating a highly sophisticated theory of states of affairs, which - without considering his other philosophical merits - already proofs his originality in comparison with both Meinong and Husserl. Finally, the historical character of the book is abandoned and replaced by a systematic investigation and evaluation of the theories of both philosophers. In the third and last chapter of the book the significance of the expression that states of affairs "obtain", with which Meinong and Reinach both operate, is explored. Stressing its original deficits, a more coherent definition for the concept of obtaining is suggested by the author, proofing its primary importance within the project of a phenomenological theory of states of affairs.