The Politics of Portfolio Design in European Democracies

Government departments are key institutions in modern democracies. They have a leading role in setting the governments agenda and provide the expertise and resources to have a lasting effect on the policy output. The allocation of government departments is thus a central element of coalition negotiations. A common assumption in coalition research is that the allocation of ministries - i.e. the distribution of competences between executive offices - is fixed and not subject to change. However, this assumption is often wrong. In the 2020 government formation process in Austria, for example, the labour department was separated from the former Ministry of Social Affairs and established as an independent ministry. In addition, several competences (e.g. integration, environment and post and communication) were assigned to other ministries during the government formation process. This research project examines the causes and consequences of changes in portfolio design. We aim to explain 1) which political actors benefit from changes in political competences and 2) which effects can be observed on policy-making as a result of changes in the portfolio design. To do so, we are working with a team of leading international political scientists to map changes in portfolio allocation over a 50-year period in 10 European countries, using laws, regulations and administrative sources. We want to understand the role of changes in portfolio allocation in modern democracies. How often do such reforms in competences occur and which policy areas are particularly affected? Are there `political reasons` behind these reforms, and if so, who wins and who loses competences? And finally: how do changes in the allocation of departments affect the workability of the government apparatus? Do reforms lead to an increase in efficiency, or are the respective departments more concerned with restructuring than with their actual tasks? We think that answers to these questions will be important for our understanding of the performance of modern European democracies.

Government departments are key institutions in modern democracies. They have a leading role in setting the government's agenda and provide the expertise and resources to have a lasting effect on the policy output. The allocation of government departments is thus a central element of coalition negotiations during the government formation process. A key assumption in this research is that portfolio design - defined as the distribution of competencies among executive offices - is fixed and exogenously given. Yet, this assumption is very often not met empirically: policy responsibilities are transferred from one department to another, new departments are created, and others are discarded or merged. This research project studies the causes and consequences of changes in portfolio design. Building on a rational-choice institutionalist framework for explaining such reforms, grounded in the office, policy, vote, and efficiency goals of political actors, we analyze portfolio design reforms in ten West European democracies from 1970 to 2022. In general, our results suggest that political motivations outweigh efficiency considerations. Reforms often take place right after governments are formed and are used to balance the power of government parties in coalition governments. Moreover, portfolio design is used as a tool to signal policy priorities of the incoming government. Efficiency considerations matter, but to a lesser extent. The project provides fresh theoretical perspectives, new datasets, and comparative findings on a pivotal component of modern governance-one with significant academic and practical implications for how democracies tackle major societal challenges such as climate change and digitalization.