Normativity and Causal Theory of Action

Context: Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional, rational and autonomous agency in terms of causal processes that lead from some of the agent`s mental states and events to actions. Opponents of this standard-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for actions that are done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it does not capture the very phenomenon of agency. My doctoral dissertation defends the standard-causal approach against challenges of that kind. My thesis, however, does not provide a full defence of the standard-causal model. My aim for future research is to address further issues and problems for the theory; in particular, I would like to address challenges that emphasise the normative nature of intentional and rational agency. Proposed Research: According to the standard-causal theory, acting for reasons does not require that the agent acts for good reasons. Rather, it requires merely that the action is done for reasons in the agent-relative sense that the action is rationalized by some of the agent`s mental states. That does justice to the intuition that whether an agent acts for reasons does not depend on whether there is normative or agent-neutral reason to perform the action. However, many philosophers argue that there is a normative element in every action that is done for reasons. The performance of the action is the agent`s response to a practical question. It is argued that this aspect concerning the agent`s first-person perspective is not properly captured by the standard-causal theory of agency, as that perspective is fundamentally different from the third-person perspective of causal explanation. It must be clarified whether there is a crucial difference between actions that can be rationalized and ones that are done for good reasons. And, if there is a crucial difference, the relationship between them must be specified in terms of the standard-causal theory. Further, it must be explained how the challenge from first-person perspective can be met, or why that challenge is misguided. Secondly, many philosophers think that an agent who acts for a reason must treat or endorse some consideration as a reason. And it has been argued that this aspect of endorsement is not captured by the standard-causal theory, as it construes actions as mere upshots of mental causes. It must, firstly, been investigated whether all acting for reasons does in fact involve the agent`s treating something as a reason. And secondly, if that is so, it must be explained how the standard-causal theory can account for an agent`s treating a consideration as a normative reason. Thirdly, it has been pointed out that an agent who acts for a reason does not merely conform to a certain norm or rule. Rather, the agent actively tries to follow a norm of rationality. Given that, one may argue that rational action must be construed in normative rather than causal terms, because the activity of rule-following cannot be reduced to manifestations of psychological dispositions and conformity to psychological laws. Again, it must investigated whether the outlined claim about acting for reasons and rule-following is correct, and, if this is so, it must be considered whether or not the activity of rule-following can be accounted for in standard-causal terms. Project and Programme: This project is designed for two years of full-time research. It would be hosted by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol, and my supervisor would be Prof. Susan Hurley, who is an expert in the philosophy of psychology and mind. In the first year of the Fellowship I would focus on the closely related first and second point. In the second year I would then turn to the related question of whether rule-following can be accounted for in standard-causal terms. My primary objective would be to publish the results and findings of my research in a series of articles in established philosophy journals. A possible secondary objective is to publish a slightly revised and extended version of my PhD thesis as a monograph.