The World in Mind: Radical Ontology and Franz Brentano

I am engaged in a research project in systematic metaphysics that would benefit from close study of the work of the 19th-century, German-born Austrian philosopher, Franz Brentano (1838-1917). This neo- Aristotelian project begins with the question of what a thing is, where a thing is whatsoever exists and thereby contributes to reality. An answer to this question is of the utmost importance to a systematic approach to metaphysics, because an informative account of ontological structure depends on it. An account of the structure in reality provides the means of elucidating, in a unified way, most key metaphysical and epistemological issues. Inasmuch as it begins at the roots of inquiry, with the very presence of an existent, the project of developing this account of a thing and its implications is aptly characterized as one of radical ontology. The primary goal of radical ontology is to provide a systematic account of the natural structure of the world, the world as it is in itself, prior to the conceptualization of conscious beings. Its ultimate goal is a comprehensive account of the relations between this natural world and the artifactual featurescreated by the conceptual, linguistic and conventional activities of conscious beingsthat overlay it. It is the mix of natural and artifactual that yields mundane reality, the workaday world in which we live. The hope is to illuminate some of the most important features of ones identity, such as ones gender, race, vocation and values, by illuminating the natural, raw materials that make everything else possible. Answering the fundamental question of what a thing is requires a singular methodology, one that begins at the interface of mind and world, with the pre-theoretic data present to one. It is here that Brentano (among others) also begins his philosophical investigations. Brentano has a realist view of the world, yet his data for knowledge of the objective world seem to be subjective, based entirely on inner perception. I am eager to examine Brentanos work because it connects ontology and mind in a way that strikes me as compelling, yet problematic in certain ways, and does so informed by a deep appreciation of Aristotle. Studying Brentano would enable me to develop further both my understanding of the subtlest connections between world and mind and an historical source that we share. However, of more interest to me than any commonalities are the differences in our views that arise from them. Despite our common interests and similar methodologies, our views diverge significantly on many important points, both metaphysical and epistemological. I need to examine these differences; doing so might enable me to revise my views or, if not, at least provide the means to better support them.

The project examined the work of the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and demonstrates the continued fruitfulness of certain of Brentanos insights. In particular, Brentanos account of what mental phenomena are is helpful in propounding an account of what a mind is. This account, in turn, enables one to provide an illuminating characterization of acquaintance, a cognitive relation of immediate engagement with things in the world. Furthermore, Brentanos neglected theory of judgmenta theory of how one takes the world to be via ones cognitive engagement with itis crucial to resolving long-standing epistemic problems associated with the view that ones basic justification for taking the world to be as it is comes from ones minds direct engagement with the objects in ones environment, rather than representations of those objects. These results indicate that Brentanos body of work is an important resource for novel insights, rather than merely an object of historical scholarly attention.