Die Welt im Geist: Radikale Ontologie und Franz Brentano

I am engaged in a research project in systematic metaphysics that would benefit from close study of the work of the 19th-century, German-born Austrian philosopher, Franz Brentano (1838-1917). This neo- Aristotelian project begins with the question of what a thing is, where a thing is whatsoever exists and thereby contributes to reality. An answer to this question is of the utmost importance to a systematic approach to metaphysics, because an informative account of ontological structure depends on it. An account of the structure in reality provides the means of elucidating, in a unified way, most key metaphysical and epistemological issues. Inasmuch as it begins at the roots of inquiry, with the very presence of an existent, the project of developing this account of a thing and its implications is aptly characterized as one of radical ontology. The primary goal of radical ontology is to provide a systematic account of the natural structure of the world, the world as it is in itself, prior to the conceptualization of conscious beings. Its ultimate goal is a comprehensive account of the relations between this natural world and the artifactual featurescreated by the conceptual, linguistic and conventional activities of conscious beingsthat overlay it. It is the mix of natural and artifactual that yields mundane reality, the workaday world in which we live. The hope is to illuminate some of the most important features of ones identity, such as ones gender, race, vocation and values, by illuminating the natural, raw materials that make everything else possible. Answering the fundamental question of what a thing is requires a singular methodology, one that begins at the interface of mind and world, with the pre-theoretic data present to one. It is here that Brentano (among others) also begins his philosophical investigations. Brentano has a realist view of the world, yet his data for knowledge of the objective world seem to be subjective, based entirely on inner perception. I am eager to examine Brentanos work because it connects ontology and mind in a way that strikes me as compelling, yet problematic in certain ways, and does so informed by a deep appreciation of Aristotle. Studying Brentano would enable me to develop further both my understanding of the subtlest connections between world and mind and an historical source that we share. However, of more interest to me than any commonalities are the differences in our views that arise from them. Despite our common interests and similar methodologies, our views diverge significantly on many important points, both metaphysical and epistemological. I need to examine these differences; doing so might enable me to revise my views or, if not, at least provide the means to better support them.

Das vorliegende Projekt widmete sich dem Werk des österreichischen Philosophen Franz Brentano (1838-1917) und zeigte, wie fruchtbar einige seiner Einsichten immer noch sind. Ganz besonders gilt dies für seine Auffassung mentaler Phänomene, die nach wie vor hilfreich ist, um eine Konzeption vernunftbegabter Wesen zu entwickeln. Umgekehrt ermöglicht es eine solche Konzeption, die Beziehung der Bekanntschaft als eine kognitive Beziehung der unmittelbaren Verbindung mit Dingen in der Welt auf erhellende Weise zu charakterisieren. Des weiteren ist Brentanos oft vernachlässigte Theorie des Urteils eine Theorie darüber, wie man sich die Welt durch eine Verbindung mit ihr denkt von entscheidender Bedeutung, um seit langem bestehende Probleme der Erkenntnistheorie zu lösen, die sich an die Auffassung knüpfen, die grundlegende Rechtfertigung dafür, wie wir uns die Welt denken, komme von einer direkten Verbindung mit den Objekten in unserer Umgebung und nicht von Repräsentationen dieser Objekte. Diese Resultate verdeutlichen, dass Brentanos Werk nicht nur ein interessanter Gegenstand für die historisch-textkritische Forschung ist, sondern auch eine wichtige Quelle neuer Einsichten.