Esteem, Self-Esteem and Natural Law, 1670-1780

Among the possible answers to the question of what could motivate moral action, the insight that humans have a desire for esteem has always played some role. This issue was particularly prominent in early modern moral and political thought, and has been revived during the past two decades in a philosophical debate initiated by Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit. Brennan and Pettit use the notion of moral economy to analyze the workings of esteem, alluding to the eighteenth-century usage of economy as any kind of value-based exchange of goods. Esteem is a good that cannot in a literal sense be exchanged for other goods, but it is a good that is often a reward for what one does and that is often a subject of competition. Furthermore, esteem is a good that can be conferred upon others through paying attention to them, through lauding them, and through associating oneself with them. The crucial question that has to be answered by any account of the moral economy of esteem is: How can the esteem-oriented mechanisms that motivate compliance with normsno matter how contingent these norms may beconstitute a motivation for genuine moral action? Answering this question presupposes finding solutions to three problems: (1) How can the desire for esteem lead beyond mere conformism? (2) How can the desire for esteem be operative in situations of a lack of publicity? (3) How can the desire for esteem be operative in situations of oppression? The present project aims to show that the natural law based early modern accounts of esteem may point towards a solution of these problems. This is so because the connection between esteem, self-esteem and norms of natural law established in early modern texts can give some hints as to how the problems of a lack of publicity, of oppression and of conformism can be solved within the workings of the moral economy of esteem. The aspects of early modern conceptions of esteem that are based on natural law may indicate ways in which the plurality of morally unobjectionable qualities that give rise to positive evaluations may have to be supplemented by values that derive from human nature. Such natural law based values can give substance to the notion of justified esteem as well as put limits to what can count as permissible relativistic norms of esteem. 1

Among the possible answers to the question of what can motivate our moral action, the insight that humans have a need for being esteemed always has played a role. The issue has been particularly prominent in early modern ethical and political thought, and it has been revived during the past two decased through a philosophical debate initiated by Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit. Brennan and Pettit use the concept of moral economy to analyse the dynamics of esteem. Thereby, they refer to the usage of "economy" in the eighteenth century, denoting any value-oriented exchange relations. Esteem is a good that cannot be exchanged for other goods in a literal sense; but it is a good that often is a reward for one's actions and that is often an object of competition. Also, esteem can be conferred upon others by devoting attention to them, by praising them or by cooperating with them. The crucial question that has to be answered by any theory of a moral economy of esteem is: How can esteem-related mechanisms that motivate the fulfilment of norms constitute a motivation for genuinely moral action? Answering this question demands a solution of the problems: (1) How can the desire for esteem go beyond mere conformism? (2) How can the desire for esteem be effective in the absence of publicity? (3) How can the desrie for esteem be effective in situations of oppression? The present project has the aim to show that early modern accounts of esteem and self-esteem can provide solutions to these problems. This is so because the norms of natural law provide grounds for justified esteem and self-esteem that counter the forces of conformism, secrecy and oppression.