France Veber´s Theory and Concept of Intentionality
France Veber´s Theory and Concept of Intentionality
Disciplines
Philosophy, Ethics, Religion (100%)
Keywords
-
Intentionality,
Hitting (Treffen,
Treffgedanke),
France Veber (Franz Veber,
1890-1975),
Presenting (Präsentationsgedanke),
Object Theory (Gegenstandtheorie),
Alexius Meinong
France Veber raised the question of intentionality in the majority of his fourteen books (1921-1939) and in several articles (written during the 25 years of his Ljubljana University appointment). In his early writings Veber based his teachings on thoughts of Franz Brentano as well as on ideas of Alexius Meinong. Intentionality is the defining attribute of psychic phenomena for Veber. If I think, I think something, I think about an object. To say it differently, a psychic phenomenon presents something, it points towards an object. Regarding mental experiences Veber distinguishes act, content and object, where act and content are mental (psychic) components, whereas an object`s nature is of non-mental quality, i.e. it is something objective. In his writings of 1928 and 1930 Veber insists in opposition to the Brentano tradition, that there also exist non-intentional mental experiences, that is to say, that Veber acknowledges psychic phenomena, which do not possess an object. He distiguishes mental experiences, which are not yet intentional - pre-intentional - from experiences, which are no more intentional - post-intentional; within the first group Veber counts instincts and inclinations, within the second class moods and caprices. At this special point of his developement Veber in addition teaches, that intentional presentations are not simply given but that they are produced by the subject(s); intentional presentations are results of so-called Vorstellungsproduktion [we deal here with a Theory of Produced Presentations]. In his last book published Frage der Wirklichkeit [The Question of Reality] (1939) Veber moves one more step away from Meinong`s Gegenstandstheorie or Theory of Objects/Items. Now he takes (his) genetic-dynamic psychology as a point of departure, and doing so, he ends up with an ontological theory of reality total. Furthermore he now defines simple (presentations or) experiences by means of a dual function: They present and they hit reality. For example, a colour sensation presents a certain colour, but it also hits the thing coloured. In consequence Veber distinguishes two worlds, one timeless universe of psychic phenomena or [Meinongian] objects and another universe of reality in time (and space), which exhibit differences in several respects: World 1 is for example timeless and it obeys necessary laws; world 2 is empirically given, dynamic, contingent und exhibits an architectonic structure: Stone, plant, animal and man. The following important goals of the project are related to recent discussions in the republic of philosophers: The question, whether Veber really developed fertile ideas, as for example the existence of non- intentional (intentionless) experiences, or to give another route, the discussion of the question of a direct contact to reality.
- Universität Graz - 100%
- Wolfgang Gombocz, Universität Graz , associated research partner