Meinongian Objects: Ontology and Logic of Intentionality

The main goal of the project is a book on Meinong`s theory of objects which will divide into three sections. In the first section, we want to present the historical background of Meinong`s theory and disentangle the immanent logic of the development which led from Brentano`s conception of the immanent object to Meinong`s theory of the entities "beyond being and non-being". Meinong`s work will be situated in a wide context of the so-called "Austrian philosophy" including Franz Brentano and his school as well as Bolzano and Zimmermann. This section will afford a cautious analysis of Meinong`s texts in the context of the (published and unpublished) works of Franz Brentano and his followers. Very often it is only this context which makes Meinong`s claims clear. In particular, it will be shown that in the unpublished manuscripts of Brentano there are many ideas which served as an (unmentioned) source of inspiration for Meinong`s theory of intentionality and for a good deal of his theory of objects. The second section will be an attempt to give a consistent intepretation of Meinong`s theory of intentionality and his ontology. The main objective of this section is to make Meinong`s theory as clear as possible, according to the methodological standards of the contemporary analytical philosophy. In this section, the conceptual tools of the contemporary analytical ontology will be extensively used and we will seek a balance between historical and systematic points of view. Finally, in the third section, we want to investigate the question, what kind of logical approach to the Meinongian objects would be the most fruitful one. This section will involve an investigation of a language with Meinongian semantics. The controverse problems of ontological commitments, of the logic of quantification and of the free logic will be adressed. This section will contain a systematic investigation, concerning an application of these theories to Meinong`s ontology and will address the peculiarities and deviations resulting from such an application. There are three possibilities of interpretation which present themselves as particularly promissing: (i) Meinong`s entities beyond being and non-being can be construed as capable of being quantified in an ontologically committing manner (which leads to a Meinongian version of the ontology of possible worlds); but (ii) we can instead claim that the Meinongian objects can be quantified only if we employ quantifiers without existential import; and finally (iii) we can even deny the very possibility of quantifying over them (which is a free logic interpretation of Meinong`s philosophy).

The main goal of the project was a monograph on Meinong`s theory of objects highlighting it both from a historical and systematic point of view. The book under the title: Eine Reise ins Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Intention und Gegenstand bei Alexius Meinong, written by the co-worker of the project, Ph.D. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, is actually in submission. In the book, the following three main goals are pursued. First of all, the author describes the historical background of Meinong`s theory and disentangles the immanent logic of the development which led from Brentano`s conception of the immanent object to Meinong`s theory of the entities "beyond being and non-being". Secondly, he presents several possible reconstructions of the theory of objects which was in fact formulated by Meinong. Finally, he investigates the question, what kind of logical approach to the Meinongian objects would be the most fruitful one. Accordingly the book involves three dimensions: a historical, an exegetical and a systematic one. Meinong`s most famous idea, developed about 1904 was that there are, in addition to the common-sense things that we encounter in our world, many non-existent objects. He describes their ontological status as "beyond being and non-being". According to Meinong, such objects have to be postulated, if we were to be able to explain our intentional states like presentation, belief and assumption. Chrudzimski`s analysis stresses an important dependence of Meinong`s theory of objects on his theory of intentionality, which at the beginning of Meinong`s philosophical career had evident Brentanian roots. Chrudzimski begins with an introducing chapter on Brentano and sketches the development of Meinong`s theory from his early studies (which are in many respects very Brentanian) to his mature theory of objects. In the closing chapters the author tries to systematise and assess Meinong`s theory of objects. He simplifies Meinong`s theory of intentionality, proposes several systematisations of the ontological categories introduced by him and sketches three possible interpretations of the concept of being "beyond being and non-being". The book offers a very comprehensive analysis of Meinong`s theory of objects. It is based on wide textual evidence and employs the tools of the contemporary analytical ontology and logic.