Intentional Objects: An Essay in Ontology

The issue of intentionality is doubtless one of the central topics in the contemporary philosophy and psychology. In the last years the problem of intentionality has been approached from various points of view. What we lack, however, is a study that approaches the matter in a more systematic and so to say "holistic" manner. This is the goal of this project. I want (A) to survey a vide variety of theories of intentionality (including also historically non- exemplified possible cases), (B) to order them within a systematic general framework, and finally (C) to defend a version of the theory of intentional objects, resembling that of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. The theory of intentional objects, that I want to defend, is nowadays in disrepute. The philosophers that are sympathetic to intentional objects are commonly accused of planting an ontological jungle. However, I want to show that the theory of intentional objects is still the best theory of intentionality available at the philosophical market. It turns out that the ontological economy of its main competitors is often merely an apparent one and that there are also excellent reasons for situating such intentional objects in the target-position of a mental act. If I succeed in showing, that the theory of intentional objects is in fact the best theory of intentionality at the market, it will be without doubt a very important result that stands in an explicit contradiction to the mainstream in the theory of intentionality and philosophy of mind. But my work will have also a value that is independent of this result. This value concerns the systematic framework that we want to develop for the sake of evaluation of the theory of intentional objects. I expect that this framework will significantly regiment the philosophical discussion in the field of the theory of intentionality. After the schema has been developed, it will be easy to situate in it any given theory; and consequently it will be much easier to see the ontological commitments, theoretical consequences and neglected possibilities of any given approach.

The issue of intentionality is doubtless one of the central topics in the contemporary philosophy and psychology. In the last years the problem of intentionality has been approached from various points of view. What we lack, however, is a study that approaches the matter in a more systematic and so to say "holistic" manner. This is the goal of this project. I want (A) to survey a vide variety of theories of intentionality (including also historically non- exemplified possible cases), (B) to order them within a systematic general framework, and finally (C) to defend a version of the theory of intentional objects, resembling that of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. The theory of intentional objects, that I want to defend, is nowadays in disrepute. The philosophers that are sympathetic to intentional objects are commonly accused of planting an ontological jungle. However, I want to show that the theory of intentional objects is still the best theory of intentionality available at the philosophical market. It turns out that the ontological economy of its main competitors is often merely an apparent one and that there are also excellent reasons for situating such intentional objects in the target-position of a mental act. If I succeed in showing, that the theory of intentional objects is in fact the best theory of intentionality at the market, it will be without doubt a very important result that stands in an explicit contradiction to the mainstream in the theory of intentionality and philosophy of mind. But my work will have also a value that is independent of this result. This value concerns the systematic framework that we want to develop for the sake of evaluation of the theory of intentional objects. I expect that this framework will significantly regiment the philosophical discussion in the field of the theory of intentionality. After the schema has been developed, it will be easy to situate in it any given theory; and consequently it will be much easier to see the ontological commitments, theoretical consequences and neglected possibilities of any given approach.