Consciousness without Content

The core component of many (mainly, but not only, Asian) spiritual traditions is what Robert Forman calls the "pure consciousness event" (PCE): a "wakeful but contentless (non-intentional) consciousness" which is achieved by meditative techniques that consist in inhibiting the mind`s object-directedness ("negative meditation"). This project will consider (a) the possibility and (b) the essence of the PCE from the perspective of a phenomenological conception of consciousness. The main question is: what is a consciousness that is not object-consciousness and in this sense not conscious of something? This project aims to discuss the hypothesis that a consciousness without any object is nothing other than pure self-awareness of consciousness itself as such: turning attention away from all objective contents of consciousness in negative meditation, so the assumption, brings consciousness itself to the fore. To examine this thesis` plausibility it is necessary to engage in careful reflections about the nature of subjectivity. These considerations will be conducted in three steps. As a theoretical starting point Part I is planned to elaborate a Husserl-oriented phenomenological conception of consciousness in contrast to naturalistic and objectivistic approaches: phenomenology not only opposes the reduction of subjective experience to physical entities, it does not consider consciousness as an objective entity at all, but in its transcendental function as the process of any object`s coming-to-appearance. Consequently, from a phenomenological point of view meditative self-awareness is not to be interpreted as "introspection," for it is rather the experience of the presence in which any object - be it "exterior" or "interior" - has its manifestation. But then the question arises as to how we can be aware of something that is no object at all: this is to be discussed in Part II, which (drawing on phenomenological theories of pre-reflective self-consciousness) will attempt to unearth a non-intentional self-awareness of consciousness ("Vollzugsbewusstsein"), which cannot be conceived within the framework of the subject-object scheme, as being the very nature of consciousness. In light of this conception it is to be considered whether sam?dhic consciousness is nothing but the becoming-explicit of precisely this pre-objective being-for-itself of subjectivity. Part III poses the question of "who" is aware of "oneself" in PCE, granted that it also dissolves any ego-conception. This problem is to be elucidated by phenomenological analyses of the meaning of "I" and also by discussing the analytic philosophy of mind`s debate about the mode of reference and the referent of the first-person pronoun. An attempt will be made to reconcile the sometimes contradictory interpretations (e. g. through the terms ?tman and an?tman) by differentiating between the ego qua product of an integration-act of consciousness on the one hand and a "pre- identificatory self" (i.e. a non-objective self that does not owe its identity to an act of identification) on the other hand. Therefore, the project`s three parts ask (I) what is consciousness, (II) how it is given to itself, and (III) who is the one who is conscious, and attempt to apply the results to the question of the nature of objectless meditative consciousness.

The core component of many (mainly, but not only, Asian) spiritual traditions is what Robert Forman calls the "pure consciousness event" (PCE): a "wakeful but contentless (non-intentional) consciousness" which is achieved by meditative techniques that consist in inhibiting the mind`s object-directedness ("negative meditation"). This project will consider (a) the possibility and (b) the essence of the PCE from the perspective of a phenomenological conception of consciousness. The main question is: what is a consciousness that is not object-consciousness and in this sense not conscious of something? This project aims to discuss the hypothesis that a consciousness without any object is nothing other than pure self-awareness of consciousness itself as such: turning attention away from all objective contents of consciousness in negative meditation, so the assumption, brings consciousness itself to the fore. To examine this thesis` plausibility it is necessary to engage in careful reflections about the nature of subjectivity. These considerations will be conducted in three steps. As a theoretical starting point Part I is planned to elaborate a Husserl-oriented phenomenological conception of consciousness in contrast to naturalistic and objectivistic approaches: phenomenology not only opposes the reduction of subjective experience to physical entities, it does not consider consciousness as an objective entity at all, but in its transcendental function as the process of any object`s coming-to-appearance. Consequently, from a phenomenological point of view meditative self-awareness is not to be interpreted as "introspection," for it is rather the experience of the presence in which any object - be it "exterior" or "interior" - has its manifestation. But then the question arises as to how we can be aware of something that is no object at all: this is to be discussed in Part II, which (drawing on phenomenological theories of pre-reflective self-consciousness) will attempt to unearth a non-intentional self-awareness of consciousness ("Vollzugsbewusstsein"), which cannot be conceived within the framework of the subject-object scheme, as being the very nature of consciousness. In light of this conception it is to be considered whether samadhic consciousness is nothing but the becoming-explicit of precisely this pre-objective being-for-itself of subjectivity. Part III poses the question of "who" is aware of "oneself" in PCE, granted that it also dissolves any ego-conception. This problem is to be elucidated by phenomenological analyses of the meaning of "I" and also by discussing the analytic philosophy of mind`s debate about the mode of reference and the referent of the first-person pronoun. An attempt will be made to reconcile the sometimes contradictory interpretations (e. g. through the terms atman and anatman) by differentiating between the ego qua product of an integration-act of consciousness on the one hand and a "pre- identificatory self" (i.e. a non-objective self that does not owe its identity to an act of identification) on the other hand. Therefore, the project`s three parts ask (I) what is consciousness, (II) how it is given to itself, and (III) who is the one who is conscious, and attempt to apply the results to the question of the nature of objectless meditative consciousness.