Politically Motivated Divestment of Property in Vienna 1933-1938

The research project shall for the first time ever subject the politically motivated divestment of property in Austro- fascism to a comprehensive scrutiny. This aspires to a reappraisal of a prime persecutorial measure against the proscribed political parties and their members by the Austro-fascist regime. Even though the divestment of property as an instrument of persecution in economic and social guise created a sweeping and comprehensive means for the elimination of political opposition by the Austro-fascist regime, the state of cognizance about it is only marginal. The wanting consideration of confiscation and liquidation of property is by no means a result of the marginal importance of the subject, but complies with the general rudimentary treatment of the time between 1933 and 1938. This interdisciplinary research project aims for an examination of the legal aspects of the divestment of property and its administrative implementation by the numerous departments of public authority involved. In addition the question for the group of persons affected by the deprivation of property will be pursued, as will be the ones for the extent, intensity and permanence of this measure and for its beneficiaries. The research will be based mostly on the archivial primary sources, especially on hitherto unknown bodies of records of two departments of the "Bundespolizeidirektion" (head office of the federal police) in Vienna, namely those of the "Büro für Organisation und Kontrolle" (office for organisation and control) and the "Liquidierungsstelle" (department of liquidation). In respect of the multitude of topics to be examined and because of the complex situation of sources different approaches are to be chosen for the different topics and various methods of historical and legal research are to be utilized, which will have to suit their respective fields and objects of research, but which are also determined by the available data. The analysis of the legal aspects will on the one hand dwell on the technical legal construction of the divestment of property and on the concrete practice of implementation and on the other hand on the intentions pursued by the legislator. A quantitative evaluation will be undertaken at least in some fields. It is a question to be examined to what degree the confiscations` extent can still be determined or if this is only possible in some fields. To be examined and interpreted are furthermore the authorities` practice in setting guidelines and the course of action of the responsible departments within the "Bundespolizeidirektion" in Vienna. Apart from the quantitative assessment the authorities` treatment of the respective political opponents and the legal entities affiliated with them is to be analysed qualitatively and portrayed by means of single cases. Furthermore the question is to be posed for the specific situation of the persons affected by the measure and a comparison of the single cases is to be undertaken.

Following the Ausschaltung [dissolution] of the Austrian parliament on 4 March 1933, numerous repressive measures directed against all political parties and organisations not loyal to the regime were decreed, including various persecutory measures concerning property. First to be affected was the KPÖ [Communist Party of Austria] (26.5.1933), followed by the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers Party] (19.6.1933) after the first major wave of terror had begun, and finally also the SDAPÖ [Social Democratic Workers Party of Austria] (12.2.1934). Until now, academic research into politically motivated divestment of property under Austrofascism has been absent from the field. The interdisciplinary research project carried out at the University of Vienna undertook to close this gap and in doing so to enter largely uncharted academic territory. The legal aspects of the divestment of property were systematically analysed. It emerged that, owing to the tangle of regulations, federal laws and administrative documents, the legal situation was very complex. In order to administrate implementation of the divestment of property, the regime did not create a separate authority that combined the various agendas involved. Rather, competencies were divided between the Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit [General Directorate of Public Security], which was subordinate to the Bundeskanzleramt [Federal Chancellors Office] and responsible for setting guidelines and final liquidation, the Liquidierungsstelle [Office of Liquidation], created in March 1934, and the Büro für Organisation und Kontrolle [Office for Organisation and Control], which was part of the Head Office of the Federal Police in Vienna and responsible for carrying out confiscation. In addition, a large number of other state agencies were involved, as well as interest groups, banks etc. and people employed by the confiscating authorities as treuhändige Verwalter [fiduciaries]. Swift implementation of the divestment of property was impossible because of the cumbersome administrative structures, but also because of the insufficient number and unprofessionalism of their personnel. Added to this was the fact that confiscating property from the Social Democrats - the main party affected proved difficult primarily because its assets were inseparable from those of its associations and organisations and a barrage of creditors claims had to be investigated in each individual case. For the most part, the divestment of property was aimed at parties, whilst individuals were affected to a much lesser extent. At least 462 associations of the banned political parties were disbanded in Vienna, of which 395 were accounted for by the SDAPÖ, from whom hundreds of rental properties and at least 69 buildings were seized. The main beneficiaries were state agencies but the Fatherlands Front, the Heimatschutz [the homeland protection paramilitary organisation], the Ostmärkische Sturmscharen [a paramilitary organisation] and Catholic associations also profited. The largest economic institutions, however, were beyond the reach of the confiscating authorities since they were to be liquidated pursuant to commercial law or had been placed under state supervision. With regard to the divestment of individual property, those stripped of citizenship on political grounds were especially targeted, as were a small number of the National Socialists involved in the July Putsch. Disproportionally high was the number of party functionaries and employees of party-owned firms affected, who not only lost their jobs but were also faced with losses in severance pay, salaries and pensions. In many proceedings, the effort expended bore no relation to the assets actual value, since not only valuables were seized but quite simply everything. This inefficient procedure can also be seen in relation to those interned in Anhaltelager [detainment camps], who were required to pay a fixed sum for their stay there. The data collected shows a significant discrepancy between the prescribed costs charged for detainment and monies actually collected. Although assets worth millions were able to be incorporated into the federal treasury, the legal and administrative frameworks were not sufficient to guarantee an effective process. Thus the barely manageable administrative work involved often bore little relation to the assets actually liquidated. The persecutory measures concerning property were thus an effective way of utterly suppressing oppositional parties, whilst the financial profit to be gained from repression represented a welcome side-effect.