Social acts, facts & agents based on Adolf Reinach’s account

The research project has two main goals. Firstly, a monographic outline of Reinach`s philosophical system is to be given, since such tool is inexistent to date (within the scientific literature I am aware of). A second task is to show the profitable applicability of Reinach`s philosophical insights within contemporary ontological debates. Corresponding to these goals my research project is divided into two parts. Part one shall concentrate on historical research, whereas the second part has to be predominantly systematic. After a reconstruction of Reinach`s philosophy in proper vicinity to primary texts the context must be clarified in which his reflection has been developing. In particular, the research must evaluate the influences Reinach took advantage of; as will be shown these are of philosophic as well as of juristic nature. Therefore, the influences of Lipps and Daubert (more generally: of the Munich circle as such), of Meinong and Husserl and of Kantorowicz and Beling are at issue here. An important part of the historical research is the intended proof that all of Reinach`s philosophy circles around his (very key notion of) states of affairs. This concept from Reinach`s workshop, to say the same in different words, is the centre around which he structures his entire system. The second part is going to apply the results of part one to issues of contemporary debates in ontology. Especially, the following themes come into sight within a reinachian framework: his idea of social acts can be exploited in order to develop a general theory of linguistic and non(necessarily)-linguistic acts. There are acts, which create social relations, without using language. Further benefit can be expected in the field of action theory: Actions can be analyzed as states of affairs. A necessary element of such states of affairs is the actor`s intention, which unifies a series of movements into one proper action. Finally, the idea of social objects should be clarified. In this respect a reinachian strongly antireductionist approach should be compared (a) with Searle`s formula "X counts as Y in the context C", (b) with the notion of "documentality" as it is developed in recent ontological debates and (c) with the conception of social objects as particular intentional objects. I promote the idea of a "differentiated approach" which, firstly, should explore the different types of social objects and which, then, should describe their different genetic structures. Different types of social objects have different ontic structures. In this respect I concentrate on one type of social objects: Cultural objects are products of social acts or of actions that are realized in a "cultural way". Acts realized in a "cultural way" involve a content (i.e. a meaning), which is shared by the social group in charge. The whole project should evolve within three years; it should prepare starting premises for a habilitation at the Karl-Franzens University in Graz. A monographic study of book length shall make public a reconstruction of Reinach`s philosophy and the development of some of his ideas. In addition to the book articles in (international) reviews as well as academic presentations will contribute to the promulgation of research results. For the final success of the project`s objectives it is necessary to improve standing contacts (in particular Munich, Turin, Geneva and Buffalo, NY) and to start new cooperation with further research centres. I have been working in the research field for several (at least five) years and I believe that the competence I acquired is good basis not only for the exploration of a new field but also for the development of new ideas.

Despite the fact that the textual production of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) is not very extensive, his philosophy exhibits a significant importance not only for the history of phenomenology, but also for the systematic reflection. Concerning the history of philosophy, this project showed that the expression `phenomenology` is not a proper name for Edmund Husserl`s philosophy, but a noun commonly used for different philosophical positions. Without any doubt Reinach`s own philosophy is phenomenological, but it shows diverging and often critical positions in respect to those of Husserl. My research proved that Reinach`s criticisms were not (only) directed against the late transcendental phase of Husserlian thought, rather they had already questioned some of the main assumptions in Husserl`s `Logical Investigations` (1900/01). In particular, Reinach criticizes Husserl`s conceptions concerning the relations between thought and intuition; furthermore he denies Husserl`s ideas regarding language as an essentially private phenomenon as well as his ideas on existence and states of affairs. Thereby Reinach refutes Husserl`s suggestion that intuition can fulfil thought: for Reinach perception is not conceptually structured. Additionally he disputes Husserl`s descriptive fallacy that language is a private phenomenon whose essence is merely to denote objects: language instantiates another essential function, i.e. the `communication function (Kundgabefunktion)` in all so-called `social acts` (`speech acts`). Finally, Reinach holds that the existence of an object is a state of affairs, whose negation can obtain. All these theoretical insights flow in an original theory of intentionality, in an articulated ontology of states of affairs as well as (and this is probably Reinach`s most innovative contribution to philosophy) in the foundation of a regional ontology dealing with the notion of sociality. In respect to the systematic point of view, the research employed Reinach`s insights in the following issues: in accordance with the distinction between experience and objectual correlate, the phenomenon of intentional action has been described in terms of a complex formation constituted by an intention (Absicht; i.e. a propositional attitude founded upon will) and by its product, i.e. a state of affairs. One of the findings of the research is that negative actions (e.g. omissions) can be quite precisely described as negative states of affairs. Research into the phenomenon of violence has been conducted in an analogous way: according to my results, acts of violence are social acts whose effects are social relations (i.e. polyadic states of affairs). A consequence of this research is that inflicted damage has to be distinguished from violence: the latter entity is a relation which ontologically depends on the former, but which does not reduce to it. Finally the ontology of social objects has been examined. A positive result of Reinach`s attitude towards social ontology is the discovery that some types of social objects instantiate essential connections. These objects are social acts and social relations. Reinach`s essentialist approach, however, can not be employed for the description of all social objects: his writings lack a description of (social) artefacts, whose proper characteristic trait is exactly the absence of any essential property. Since social artefacts have a fundamental relevance for social ontology, we must state that Reinach`s apriori ontological project is only a partially navigable route for social ontology.