The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Essence and Modality

Judgments concerning modality are integral parts of our everyday lives. If we are cautious, we bring an umbrella because we judge that, even though it is sunny, its possible that it will rain in the afternoon. We understand the warning that an object might break when we drop it. If we understand some basic things about geometry, we know that the angle sum of a triangle must be 180 degrees. Similarly we know that mathematical or geometrical truths in general are a matter of necessity. If we think about it, we know that it is merely contingent that we measure distances in meters and yards and, thus, that it might have been otherwise. The philosophy of modality poses two crucial questions, one metaphysical (M) and the other epistemological (E), concerning these and other modal propositions: (M)What is modality? In virtue of what do modal propositions possess their modal status? (E)How do we acquire knowledge of modal propositions? In virtue of what do we know of the modal status of propositions? These are the core questions of modal metaphysics and modal epistemology, which are two flourishing sub- disciplines in contemporary theoretical philosophy. This research project is especially concerned with the prospects of giving an essentialist answer to these questions. According to some essentialist accounts in current debates, modal propositions possess their modal status in virtue of the essences of the objects involved in these propositions. Moreover, it is claimed that we know modal propositions in virtue of our knowledge of these essences. Proceeding from the hypothesis that such essentialist accounts have some crucial advantages over competing approaches in the philosophy of modality, this project aims to defend essentialism about modality against some crucial objections and to explore what the main thesis of essentialism, that modality is grounded in essences, exactly amounts to. The new and innovative aspect of the project consists in the guiding hypothesis that these objectives are best accomplished by employing methods and notions of a Husserlian phenomenology. Although modal metaphysics and modal epistemology are much discussed areas in contemporary philosophy, Edmund Husserls comprehensive phenomenological theory of essences has not yet received the attention that it deserves. This research project aims to change this fact by offering a phenomenological account of modal metaphysics and epistemology and by exploring the ways that Husserlian phenomenology and contemporary essentialism can mutually strengthen each other. Yet, the project is not meant to mainly address a comparative, exegetical or historical task. Rather its crucial task is to tackle the questions regarding modal epistemology and metaphysics and to provide new and innovative answers to them.

The project "The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Essence and Modality" proceeded from the following two questions concerning the philosophy of modality, i.e. of possibility and necessity: (MQ) What is modality? In virtue of what do modal propositions possess their modal status? (EQ) How do we acquire knowledge of modal propositions? In virtue of what do we know of the modal status of propositions? These are the core questions of modal metaphysics (MQ) and modal epistemology (EQ), which are two flourishing sub-disciplines in contemporary philosophy. The project operated under the hypothesis that the notion of essence plays a crucial role in answering both these questions. (MA) If some proposition p is necessary, then this is so, because p is true in virtue of the nature or essence of some entity e. (EA) Our modal knowledge is based on our knowledge of essences, i.e. on our knowledge of the natures of things. It was the goal of the project to assess two philosophical approaches that endorse these essentialist answers: Husserlian phenomenology and neo-Aristotelian essentialism. With regard to this the following research questions took center stage in the project: (1) What arguments can be made for (EA), i.e. the claim that modal knowledge is based on knowledge of essence? (2) What exactly does the epistemology of essence look like, i.e. how do we acquire knowledge of essence in the first place? (3) Does (MA), i.e. the claim that essence is the source or explanation of necessity sustain closer scrutiny? (4) What kind of explanatory link holds between essence and modality? (5) What is the relation between phenomenological and neo-Aristotelian approaches to essence and modality? With regard to (1), the project was able to find a novel argument for the importance of essentialist knowledge in our pursuit of knowledge of modality. The project's observation was that most of the widely discussed accounts in the epistemology of modality suffer from the so-called "Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction". All of those approaches use methods that need to be appropriately restricted so as to not lead us astray in our pursuit of modal knowledge. Knowledge of essence can provide the needed epistemic friction. But how do we acquire knowledge of essence in the first place? By comparing different accounts from the phenomenological and the neo-Aristotelian camp and critically assessing them the project was able to significantly contribute to an answer to questions (2) and (5). The project was able to find and innovative respond to the currently prevailing criticism, according to which essences are incapable of explaining necessity. By reinterpreting the precise explanatory connection between essence and modality, the project defends (MA) and thereby answers questions (3) and (4).