The Limits of Imagination. Animals, Empathy, Anthropomorphis

The project aims at an analysis of the relevance as well as the limits of imagination in ethics. Animal ethics will serve as an important example of the investigations, but also the perspective on and the treatment of humans, who do not conform to an alleged average normality, (for instance, people with disability) play a pivotal role. To date, many relevant theories in ethics generally and in animal ethics in particular emphasise (supposedly) rational principles and methods when reflecting on moral obligations. Yet such a procedure disregards that, in a responsible treatment of humans and animals, imagination and empathy which always show an emotional component play a crucial role. Moreover, it is relevant to be aware under which conditions and in the face of which groups of living beings we reach the limits of understanding, empathy and compassion. Is it always easily possible to empathise with a jellyfish, a bat or, for instance, with a human person with autism and, consequently, do justice to them? Drawing from relevant theories on empathy and intersubjectivity, this project will, therefore, tackle the following questions: 1. What can imagination do? How is our imaginative power influenced by social and cultural realities? To what extent can we learn or at least support imagination? 2. Empathy, i.e. the capacity to read and understand others emotions and intentions, will be examined regarding the basic possibility to know something about foreign mental states. Moreover, we will tackle the question how cultural prerequisites co-determine what we can(not) understand and where the frontier of empathy lies. 3. Are we always bound to a specifically human perspective? What would that mean for our dealing with animals, wouldnt we find, thus, only the human in the animal? If we tacitly proceed from a particular image of the human how does this influence empathy with those humans, who do not conform to this image due to impairment, illness or other forms of anormality?

The project *The Limits of Imagination: Animals, Empathy, Anthropomorphism* explored the possibilities and limitations of understanding others-whether across species boundaries or across the boundaries of gender, class, ethnicity, culture, or disability. It was important to keep both the epistemic and ethical implications in mind: What kind of access do we have to the experiences of others, and what role does our understanding play in morally justifiable treatment of humans and animals? The latter becomes particularly evident when there is disagreement about whether and what an individual feels, to what extent it can be hurt or offended, and whether its needs can be adequately addressed. Dr. Carlo Salzani, Dr. Martin Huth, and Ruadhn James Flynn, PhD, have used various methods (phenomenology, analytical philosophy, standpoint epistemology, literary theory, cultural studies, etc.) to analyze whether and to what extent we can understand the behavior and well-being of human and nonhuman individuals. A central concern in this process was to examine the sociocultural prerequisites of this understanding: What are the concepts, categories, taxonomies, and prevailing ways of thinking that underpin the understanding of others? In particular, the project addressed the prejudices and biases manifest within these frameworks: the pitfalls of anthropomorphism, prevailing views on the human-animal difference, prevailing views of animals and their cognitive and emotional capacities, and the classification of animals into categories such as farm animals, pets, and wildlife, etc. (Farm animals are generally treated with less empathy than, say, companion animals), prevailing views of humans as endowed with certain abilities, but also stereotypical views of people with atypical bodies (disabilities, chronic illnesses, dysmorphia, etc.), which lead to the exclusion of people with disabilities from public visibility and, in extreme cases, to ableist dehumanization of these individuals. Furthermore, the vulnerability of humans and animals became a central theme. Vulnerability in all its facets is not visible as such (like a wound or a symptom), but only becomes a potential subject of consideration through collective and individual imagination. The battles over the interpretation of vulnerability (who is actually vulnerable, and how can different forms of vulnerability be weighed against one another) highlight the necessity of such an engagement with imagination (and empathy). These efforts were made visible through articles in journals and anthologies; through academic events and publications organized by the project team itself; Carlo Salzani's monograph titled *Animals, Empathy, and Anthropomorphism: The Limits of Imagination*; Ruadhn Flynn's dissertation *Whose Standpoint Matters? Disability, Allyship, and Knowledge in Community*; and numerous lectures. A philosophical examination of these topics cannot lead to a definitive conclusion for understanding others. Its value lies primarily in fostering an awareness that our interactions with different people and animals are not always sufficiently understanding and empathetic.