Debunking Moral Generalism

How should we decide what to do? How should we justify our actions? How can we know which action is the right thing to do? These questions are fundamental to moral philosophy. To answer these questions, philosophers usually look for one (absolute) or more principles of morality. The idea that morality should be grounded in one or more principles or generalizations is called moral generalism. In this book, this idea and its arguments are debunked, and a strong moral particularism is advocated. The author argues that there are no substantive true moral generalizations, and that the existence and provision of such generalizations are not necessary conditions for plausible moral thought and action. Three arguments in favor of moral particularism are presented. Firstly, even though some types of actions, such as torturing people or helping the needy, might have moral properties of their own, the propositions about them cannot be true. Secondly, moral generalizations are not necessarily needed to understand and explain particular moral facts ontologically. Thirdly, moral education should be carried out through immersion in moral practice instead of the inculcation of moral principles.