Naturalizing Meaning

The project is dedicated to the question how naturalistic and pragmatist tendencies in the analytic philosophy of the 1920s shaped the positions within the Vienna Circle. A central focus is placed on the influence of Bertrand Russells and Frank Ramseys naturalistic and pragmatic conceptions of meaning, representation and propositions on the Vienna Circle. During the central phase of the Vienna Circle, around 1930, Wittgensteins Tractatus and his picture theory of meaning were increasingly criticized. In Cambridge, Wittgenstein was in close contact with Ramsey, who had criticized central aspects of the picture theory from early on. Wittgenstein also discussed the problems of his theory with members of the Vienna Circle (Waismann, Schlick, Carnap). After 1930, the members of the Circle were increasingly looking to replace Wittgensteins original theory of meaning. As Carnap and Neurath defended a new form of naturalism, i. e. physicalism, naturalistic theories of meaning and representation became more and more attractive to them. It is a central hypothesis of the project that Russells naturalistic conception of propositions (Russell 1919), his formulation of a causal theory of meaning (Russell 1921), Ramseys success semantics (Ramsey 1927), a theory shaped by pragmatism, as well as the causal conception of language developed by behaviorism played an essential role in the Vienna Circles attempts to formulate a new theory of meaning. An important advantage of Russells and Ramseys theories was their compatibility with the naturalism of the physicalists. It is the aim of the project to show the role of Russells and Ramseys theories in the formation of causal theories and use theories of meaning in logical empiricism. New archival sources will be used in order to reconstruct the discussions between Ramsey, Wittgenstein and Waismann, as well as their impact on the Vienna Circle. Waismanns theoretical input and his role as a mediator between the views in Cambridge and Vienna will receive special attention. In a first step, the project will investigate the reasons why Wittgensteins picture theory of meaning was increasingly abandoned by the Vienna Circle at the end of the 1920s. Then, the options for a new theory of meaning will be analyzed: Carnaps and Neuraths ideas about a causal theory of meaning in the context of physicalism and Waismanns preferences for a use theory of meaning, as well as for a linguistically reformulated theory of intentionality. These theoretical debates will be put into relation with contemporary naturalistic theories of meaning and representation.

Drawing on Russell's and Ramsey's philosophy of the 1920s, the project examined the impact of naturalistic theories (Russell 1919, 1921, 1927) and pragmatic theories (Ramsey 1927, 1931) of meaning, propositions and concepts on the Vienna Circle. The core thesis of the project is that these theories significantly shaped the understanding of meaning, propositions, concepts and grammar in the Vienna Circle. In this regard, the project examined especially Wittgenstein's exchanges with Ramsey and Waismann. In particular, the close connection between the philosophy of the middle Wittgenstein (1929-36), the late Ramsey (1928-29) and the early Waismann (from 1929) was reconstructed from archival sources. The exchange between these philosophers led to a substantial reorientation within the Vienna Circle itself and manifested in a series of new positions: a finitism in the philosophy of mathematics, the conception of hypotheses as (inference-) rules and the conception of the syntax of a language as a freely chosen purely formal calculus. The project investigated how these positions shaped the Vienna Circle from 1930 onward, with a special focus on Friedrich Waismann as a link between England and the Vienna Circle. Through him, the above-mentioned positions were extensively discussed within the Circle. These discussions led to (1) an instrumentalist view of natural laws as hypotheses; (2) the view that the syntax of a language and logic itself can be freely chosen according to pragmatic considerations; (3) the view of the "open texture" of concepts, i.e. the view that most concepts have a kind of incompleteness. The project showed how this reorientation became visible in the Vienna Circle, in particular position (1) in Schlick, position (2) in Carnap and position (3) in Waismann. Concerning position (1), we examined how the view of hypotheses as rules followed directly from Wittgenstein's and Ramsey's finitism. Regarding position (2), we showed how the discussions between Ramsey and Wittgenstein and of the latter with Waismann led to an increasing criticism of the logic of the Tractatus: Depending on the area of application, there must be different logics; logic cannot be justified empirically, but is based on conventions. Through Waismann's discussions with Carnap, this led to the conception of a pragmatic choice of logical systems (Carnap's "principle of tolerance"). Regarding position (3), Waismann's theory of concepts as a system of hypotheses was reconstructed in its context (Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein). Accordingly, a concept is a system of hypotheses or rules that connects different areas of experience. As such a system, a concept always remains open to revisions and to experiences that were not taken into account in the initial system of hypotheses; hence the fundamental open texture of concepts. All these features represented substantially revised conceptions of the nature of logic, general propsoitions and concepts.