Deviant Actualism

The main purpose of the project to follow is to advance and defend an account of existence - to be called Deviant Actualism - according to which there is no need to resort to any among (i) nonexistent objects, (ii) mere possibilia, (iii) free logics techniques, viz. inner and outer domains of quantification, in order to satisfactorily cope with a cluster of problems in object theory (for which one among (i) - (iii) is usually invoked for) such as the paradox of negative existentials, the status of fictional entities, or some puzzles related to tense & existence. Our account manages in fact to provide a unified solution to the foregoing problems by way of inflating the actual world (hence the label `Actualism`) with entities usually (but mistakenly, on our view) regarded as nonexistent, as merely possible, or as fictional, where this programme is to be accomplished through the endorsement of a well-known class of quantified modal logics, namely S5-structures underpinned by constant domain semantics for the quantifiers (hence the label `Deviant` to qualify here Actualism propounded). The research programme intends to provide the semantical and metaphysical resources in light of which the ontological status of traditionally worrisome entities, namely nonexistents, fictional and merely possible objects, can be levelled to actual existence, the only difference being that individuals like Pegasus or Santa Klaus - by most if not all theorists conceived of as non-actual - are abstract at the actual world, while possibly concrete somewhere else, yet equally existing both at the actual world and at other worlds. The task of making such entities actual will be accomplished through (i) a full-scale defence of possible-worlds semantics; (ii) a vindication of the Barcan Formulae, as engine of the constant domain semantics machinery, against criticism such as Quine`s; (iii) the endorsement of the dichotomy abstract-concrete. For we intend to show that if one takes seriously both possible-worlds semantics and the dichotomy abstract-concrete, then there is no need for any kind of ens non gratum such as possibilia or nonexistent objects in order to do full justice of many conundra in object theory. Not only, finally, does the proposed solution aim to stand as a unifying theory for the problems mentioned above; it also purports to qualify as an actualistically-oriented kind of Ontological Inflationism, according to which the claim Any object whatsoever is an actual existing object is made consistent with Hamlet`s famous dictum "There are many more things in heaven and earth than which are dreamt of by" most non-deviant actualist ontologies.