On the epistemic status of the mental,starting from Brentano

In modern times, starting from Descartes, there was a strong current that assumes that the judgments that accompany our mental states are infallible (or at least always correctable). Timothy Williamson speaks in this context of the thesis of the "mental luminosity" of mental states. It is this luminosity that should make it possible for us to always know, without observation, which mental state we are in at the moment. This project deals with the objections Williamson and other contemporary philosophers, such as Eric Schwitzgebel, have raised against this thesis. Because of these objections, the view has recently prevailed in epistemology that so-called phenomenal self-descriptions are fallible, e.g. the description of a sensory experience that occurs when hearing, seeing or tasting. But is this view really convincing? This project collects reasons for not giving up the thesis of the luminosity of mental states too quickly. The reasons for this are twofold. First, it is still not completely clear what a claim to infallible self-knowledge exactly means. The second reason is that not all resources have been exhausted to test the resilience of this thesis. Therefore, this project is dedicated to the Austrian philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano (1838- 1917), who was an explicit supporter of the Cartesian position. From Brentano`s point of view, the metaphorical thesis of mental luminosity can be understood as follows: Inner perception is so self-evident that it needs no further justification. The aim of the project is to investigate the power of this defense of the Cartesian position proposed by Brentano.

The research project aimed at evaluating the plausibility of the traditional, viz. Cartesian view of the mental, one according to which the realm of the mental has a special epistemic status. More accurately, the project aimed to examine Franz Brentano's (Cartesian) view of inner perception and to see whether such a view can be defended against contemporary criticism. Two axes of the project have been developed. The systematic study of Brentano's view of the mental-more accurately, the systematic study of Brentano's thesis that we always know what mental state we currently are in-and the critical assessment of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. First, the principal investigator has defended a reconstruction of Brentano's theory which is alternative to the one that has recently received the most attention. The reconstruction holds that inner perception is a real part of the mental phenomenon it refers to. Secondly, the principal investigator has observed that Williamson's argument relies on an unspecified notion of sensation and that much of its dialectical strength relies on the notion of sensation which is put at work. He has argued that once sensations are conceived of in intentionalist terms, the argument loses its force. Importantly, an intentionalist conception of sensations can be found both in Brentano and Descartes. The principal investigator has argued that the intentionalist may present the anti-luminist with a destructive dilemma. Either way, the anti-luminist is in trouble: on the first horn, the argument struggles to take off; on the second horn, it simply fails. The principal investigator holds that these results may represent an advancement in two fields: the first field is that of the history of philosophy; the second field is that of the philosophy of mind. Concerning the systematic reconstruction of Brentano's theory of inner perception, the principal investigator believes that it is not only interesting for contemporary philosophers of mind-notably for so-called higher-order theorists-, but also exegetically more accurate than the other available. Importantly, the principal investigator holds that his work on Brentano's philosophy is a successful application of the method of rational reconstruction. The principal investigator has provided an examination of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument from the point of view of the philosophy of mind. This is remarkable, he submits, for the debate on the argument in question is still mainly led from the point of view of epistemology. More precisely, much of the debate focuses on Williamson's assumptions about the nature of knowledge-notably, the safety constraint he imposes on the latter-whereas the principal investigator has focused on the very notion of sensation, and hence on the background assumptions of the argument in question.