Franz Brentano’s theory of intentional inexistence

This project is about Franz Brentanos (1838-1917) theory of intentional inexistence, which has become a controversial issue in Analytic Philosophy as well as in Phenomenology. As Brentano says in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), the most characteristic feature of a mental phenomenon is its directness towards an object. Hence we can understand the subjectivity of experience only by understanding its immanent objectivity. For instance, if a subject is seeing a red object, we must distinguish not only between the subject and the experience of seeing, but also between the act of seeing and the red object that is seen. Furthermore, we can ask whether the object is really red or whether it only appears to be red. The claim of intentional inexistence is that an object, which appears red to the subject, is somehow contained in the act of seeing, whatever the external circumstances may be that cause the visual experience. The task of a theory of intentional inexistence is to explain what this intuitive idea of containment comes to. Brentano addresses this problem not only in his Psychology but also in earlier and later writings. Scholars disagree about how one should interpret the view of intentional inexistence that Brentano develops. Does Brentano understand the immanent objectivity of mental phenomena always in the same way, or can one find different theories in his writings? And more importantly: Can one find in Brentano a theory of intentional inexistence that does not commit him to a realm of objects whose ontological status is completely unclear? The present project approaches this question both from an exegetical and a systematic point of view: We assume that there may be more than one consistent interpretation of the texts that Brentano left behind. In particular, we want to show that Brentanos writings on intentional inexistence can be interpreted in such a way that Brentano is ontologically committed to a special realm of intentional objects; but it can also be interpreted in such a way that the term intentional inexistence acquires an ontologically neutral meaning. Given that the latter interpretation is to be preferred from a systematic point of view, we recommend that one should read Brentanos theory in an ontologically neutral way. The project will consist of two parts. In the first part, we give an overview of the divergent interpretations of Brentanos theory of intentional inexistence that one finds in the current literature. This survey will be conducted by identifying the key questions on which these interpretations differ. The second part will consist in confronting these interpretations with the actual texts of Brentano on intentional inexistence. We focus on his writings from the period 1874-1904 because this is the critical period for deciding between what we call the commitment view and the non-commitment view. The aim of the project is to provide a critical edition of these texts in order to document our claim that Brentanos writings are consistent with both views, and that a decision between these interpretations can therefore be made on systematic grounds alone.

Brentano's Theory of Intentional Inexistence The project was about the early theory of intentionality in the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1917). By "intentionality" or "intentional inexistence" is meant both the directedness of consciousness towards an object and the 'containingness' of the object in the act of consciousness. For example: When a person sees a bird, his visual perception refers to the bird. Moreover, this mental act contains the bird as an intentional object even if the bird is not perceived but only imagined. In the philosophical debate, therefore, the question is discussed to what extent such intentional objects can exist in the act of consciousness. There are different answers to this question. Therefore, we first dealt with the divergent current interpretations of Brentano's theory of intentional inexistence and then compared these positions with some, mostly unpublished, texts of Brentano on intentional inexistence. We focused particularly on Brentano's texts from 1874-1904. A critical edition with some unpublished manuscripts by Brentano is currently being prepared for publication. On the basis of the project and the examined manuscripts to be published, it can now be considered certain that one cannot meaningfully understand Brentano's theory of intentional inexistence without having understood his theory of language. This is not only a philosophical-historical advance for the understanding of Brentano's theory. Rather, this insight can be generalized and made systematically fruitful for a better understanding of consciousness. The implications of this thesis are significant not only in the philosophy of mind, but also for closely related debates. These include, for example, questions about the possibility of group consciousness ("we-intentionality"), artificial intelligence ("Can computers think?") or theories of fiction ("What is the status of fictional characters we refer to collectively?").