The Synthetic A Priori. Toward a Phenomenological Account

My research proposal addresses the question whether synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, and aims at providing an affirmative answer by putting into philosophical action some key epistemological concepts of husserlean phenomenology. In the first part of the project I shall compare Husserl`s conception of analyticity with P. Boghossian`s-nowadays widely accepted--notion of epistemic analyticity: I shall point out (1) that though probably every (husserlean) analytic statement is epistemically analytic, not every (epistemically) synthetic statement is synthetic in the husserlean sense. The second part will be devoted to asking whether a contemporary upholder of the synthetic a priori should endorse a commitment to the a priori knowability of (epistemically) synthetic statements. I shall argue for an affirmative answer. I shall claim (2) that such dispute pivotes on the a priori knowability of potentially informative propositions, where a statement is not potentially informative, roughly, if, necessarily, every subject who understands it is justified in accepting it. Since (epistemically) analytic statements are not potentially informative, (2) entails that a commitment to the a priori knowability of (epistemically) synthetic statements is necessary to safeguard synthetic a priori knowledge. I shall also suggest that Husserl`s theory of meaning does not entail that synthetic statements in his sense are (epistemically) analytic. Husserl`s positive epistemological account-centred upon eidetic seeing-is however insufficient: it is unable to face the standard empiricist objection as to the causal inexplicability of the alleged access to informative necessary truth. The third part is therefore devoted at strengthening Husserl`s account. I shall do so by rejecting the presupposition upon which the objection is based: that a causal account of a faculty`s reliability is required for accepting it as a source of justification. Firstly, I shall point out some weaknesses in the externalist account of justification. Secondly, I shall argue that justification is a property of beliefs that can be illuminated in purely phenomenological terms. Finally, I shall suggest that the phenomenological account both vindicates the Status of perception as a source of justification and the status of Wesenserschauung as a source of justification.