Since the original enactment of the Austrian Civil Code in 1811, the legal concept of thing (German:
Sache) has included both tangible and intangible objects. While the notion of intangible objects has
received limited attention in legal scholarship, it carries significant systematic implications: it implies
that certain rights can be owned and possessed, thus qualifying as property. However, this is in tension
with today`s prevailing civil law doctrine, which assumes that property and rights must always be
strictly separated. Consequently, the legislator`s definition of intangible objects is largely viewed as
functionless and incompatible with contemporary Austrian law.
This book analyses the concept of intangible objects within the Austrian Civil Code, tracing its
historical foundations. The broad legal definition of objects reflects a longstanding tradition rooted in
Roman law and earlier codifications preceding the Austrian Civil Code. It demonstrates that the
understanding of property in Austrian civil law underwent a paradigm shift in the mid-19th century
due to influences from German jurisprudence, resulting in a diminished role for intangible objects in
legal discourse.
Despite this, the book argues that intangible objects remain crucial within the legal framework of the
Austrian Civil Code. The impact of German civil law doctrine on Austrian law has introduced
numerous inconsistencies that can be addressed through the concept of intangible objects. Thus, this
legal concept is not only vital for classifying new phenomena of dematerialization but also opens new
avenues for resolving previously unsolved issues in civil law, company law, securities law, and
intellectual property law.