The consequences of coalition compromise on public opinion

In the majority of the worlds advanced democracies right after the elections, parties, with preferences that may diverge, must compromise over a common coalition agreement. Coalition compromises, however, pose a serious dilemma for representative democracy: on the one hand, voters should prefer representatives who stand firm on principles and keep their electoral promises, on the other hand however, political compromise represents one of the essential qualities of liberal democracy, and it is central to deliberation and legislative policymaking. Although in the majority of European democracies elections are followed by a coalition government compromise, despite there is growing evidence that the content of coalition agreements receives broad media and public attention and voters observe coalition compromises, virtually nothing is known on the consequences that coalition compromises have on public opinion. Against this background, this proposal examines (1) which coalition compromises are more likely to be accepted by voters, (2) which voters are more likely to accept or resist coalition compromises and (3) what short and long-term consequences coalition compromises have on voters. The current proposal is innovative in that it (a) systematically studies the consequences of coalition compromises in Europe by advancing a novel and comprehensive theoretical framework, (b) applies several innovative content analysis techniques to measure the type of coalition compromises and survey experiments to measure citizen acceptance and rejection of these compromises. The findings of my research will provide important insights into the difficulties and challenges of representative democracy. The evidence produced by this project is important especially in light of the recent success of populist parties that tend to refute government participation and the key features that are intrinsic to pluralism, that is, elite bargaining and compromise. In this regard, the evidence that will emerge from this study is of interest for both the academic community as continuous efforts are made to better understand the mass - elite electoral connection but also beyond. The aim of this project is in fact to also reach beyond the academia by disseminating new information and actively contributing to debates on citizen trust and approval of the political institutions of their country. Main applicant: Dr. Carolina Plescia. Co-applicant: Prof. Sylvia Kritzinger

The consequences of coalition government compromise on public opinion In the majority of the world's advanced democracies right after the elections, parties, with preferences that may diverge, must compromise over a common coalition agreement. However, coalition compromises pose a serious dilemma for representative democracy. On the one hand, in fact, voters should prefer representatives who stand firm on principles and keep their electoral promises. On the other hand, political compromise represents one of the essential qualities of liberal democracy and elite compromise is central to deliberation and legislative policymaking. Although in the majority of European democracies elections are followed by a coalition government compromise, and there is growing evidence that the content of coalition agreements receives broad media and public attention, very little is known about the consequences that coalition compromises have on public opinion. Against this background, my project which run from 2018 to 2023 has examined (1) which coalition compromises are more likely to be accepted by voters, (2) which voters are more likely to accept or resist coalition compromises and (3) what consequences coalition compromises have on voters. To answer these questions, I have used both existing interview data with citizens across Western democracies and designed novel survey experiments to strengthen the validity of the findings. Three main results stand out. First, when parties shift ideologically to join coalition governments voters only notice these shifts when they are substantial and, in such cases, voters respond by decreasing party preferences. Second, voters prefer coalition compromises that are closer to them ideologically, but it will matter even more whether such governments include coalition partners that are highly disliked. Third, voters' acceptance of policy compromises depends on both the strength of their party attachment and the importance they assign to the issue at stake during the coalition negotiations. Hence, not giving in on important issues is key for voters, especially for supporters of parties that have never been in government before, and who hold strong policy preferences on a selected number of issues. These results help explain the failures of government formation attempts in increasingly polarized societies and political gridlock.