Adverse Allies: Logical Empiricism and Austrian Economics

Logical empiricism and Austrian economics are the two internationally most influential intellectual movements with Viennese roots. Proponents of the Vienna Circle and of the Austrian School have shaped the development of philosophical, scientific, and political debate in the 20th century. In the 21st century, logical empiricism has undergone extensive re-evaluation and the Austrian School experiences another revival. Yet, despite numerous connections and interactions between the two movements, their relationship has captured surprisingly sparse attention in the historical and philosophical literature. If an account is provided at all, logical empiricists and Austrian economists are portrayed as philosophically, scientifically, and politically antithetical groups. Among the most frequently mentioned contrastive pairs of catchwords are empiricism vs apriorism, formal methods vs verbal reasoning, and socialism vs classical liberalism. Acknowledging the existence of disagreements between logical empiricism and the Austrian School, my research project challenges the received view of antithetical opposition. I will reconstruct neglected compatibilities and similarities between the two movements. Some of these consensuses will motivate constructive improvements in the logical empiricist tradition and in the vicinity of the Austrian School in order to advance contemporary debates in philosophy, science, and politics. I focus on six research spotlights and address questions such as: (1) What are potential advantages and disadvantages of formal methods in the social sciences and humanities? Which formal methods are compatible with Austrian economics? (2) How can scientific utopianism inform research, policy advice, and education? As a case study, I analyse Joseph Popper-Lynkeus social program as a precursor to universal basic income. (3) How can normative statements be evaluated, criticized, or justified? On a meta-level, how can we fruitfully analyse the role of normative statements in arguments? (4) Instead of the extremely aprioristic version of praxeology, I previously proposed and sketched analytic praxeology as the methodology of (one branch of) Austrian economics. What are the prospects of a further developed analytic praxeology? What exactly can we deduce from a formalized fundamental axiom of praxeology? (5) Tolerance is a central tenet of the approach of the Austrian School. Karl Menger and Rudolf Carnap famously extended tolerance even to logic. What role did Hans Hahn play in the early history of the principle of logical tolerance? Is logical tolerance compatible with Ludwig Mises criticism of polylogism? Are there broader, societal consequences to be drawn from logical tolerance? (6) Otto Neurath and Ludwig Mises defended democracy with different arguments than Hans Kelsen. Are there lessons to be drawn for contemporary challenges to democracy including language barriers, the role of experts, and education?

Logical empiricism and the Austrian Economics shaped the development of philosophical, scientific, and political debates in the twentieth century. The two intellectual movements are traditionally portrayed as being opposed philosophically, scientifically, and politically. My project "Adverse Allies" questions this standard assessment of antithetical opposition by reconstructing neglected similarities and compatibilities. These convergences trigger solutions to current problems in philosophy, science, and politics: (1) The use of formal methods in the social sciences involves not only benefits but also certain risks. Arguments by Austrian economists clarify this, yet do not justify a wholesale rejection of formal methods. (2) I show how, building on Otto Neurath's scientific utopianism and Ludwig Mises's "imaginary constructions", one can develop templates that allow political proposals and their effects to be systematically compared. The criteria of comparison themselves are always up for debate as well. I rebut a logical objection to the feasibility of this program (Mulder&Muller 2023) by means of a syntactic proof. The proof also indicates that conclusions from such comparisons-and from thought experiments in general-are unreliable when conducted in natural languages. (3) As a case study of scientific utopias, I analyze Joseph Popper-Lynkeus's social program and variants of unconditional basic income. Many basic income proposals fail to specify the criteria of eligibility clearly. (4) Logical empiricism and earlier versions of the Austrian School seek to keep descriptive and normative statements strictly separate. Critics challenge the possibility and usefulness of this endeavor, among other things by claiming that it renders meaningful discussion of normative questions impossible. I defend the separation-within a given language-and identify ten strategies for meaningful discussion of normative questions despite the separation. I substantiate the usefulness of the separation by discussing various concepts of "welfare" and their use in scientific and political discourse. (5) From a logical-empiricist perspective and from the viewpoint of contemporary philosophy of science, the standard justification of the action axiom on which the Austrian School's economic theory rests is untenable. I have further developed my proposal for an alternative justification ("analytic praxeology"). The new justification is not only compatible with logical empiricism and modern philosophy of science; it also meets quality criteria within the Austrian tradition better than the standard justification. Analytic praxeology has an epistemic status similar to that of game theory. (6) I show that Otto Neurath and Ludwig Mises identify similar challenges for democracy, including language barriers. They also defend democracy with similar arguments, which, however, differ from Hans Kelsen's. For all three authors, democracy is a strategy for dealing with value plurality. Value consensus is therefore neither a precondition nor a goal of democracy. Neurath's scientific utopianism provides the basis for a proposal to transparently separate the roles of political decision-makers and scientific experts.