Adverse Allies: Logical Empiricism and Austrian Economics

Logical empiricism and Austrian economics are the two internationally most influential intellectual movements with Viennese roots. Proponents of the Vienna Circle and of the Austrian School have shaped the development of philosophical, scientific, and political debate in the 20th century. In the 21st century, logical empiricism has undergone extensive re-evaluation and the Austrian School experiences another revival. Yet, despite numerous connections and interactions between the two movements, their relationship has captured surprisingly sparse attention in the historical and philosophical literature. If an account is provided at all, logical empiricists and Austrian economists are portrayed as philosophically, scientifically, and politically antithetical groups. Among the most frequently mentioned contrastive pairs of catchwords are empiricism vs apriorism, formal methods vs verbal reasoning, and socialism vs classical liberalism. Acknowledging the existence of disagreements between logical empiricism and the Austrian School, my research project challenges the received view of antithetical opposition. I will reconstruct neglected compatibilities and similarities between the two movements. Some of these consensuses will motivate constructive improvements in the logical empiricist tradition and in the vicinity of the Austrian School in order to advance contemporary debates in philosophy, science, and politics. I focus on six research spotlights and address questions such as: (1) What are potential advantages and disadvantages of formal methods in the social sciences and humanities? Which formal methods are compatible with Austrian economics? (2) How can scientific utopianism inform research, policy advice, and education? As a case study, I analyse Joseph Popper-Lynkeus social program as a precursor to universal basic income. (3) How can normative statements be evaluated, criticized, or justified? On a meta-level, how can we fruitfully analyse the role of normative statements in arguments? (4) Instead of the extremely aprioristic version of praxeology, I previously proposed and sketched analytic praxeology as the methodology of (one branch of) Austrian economics. What are the prospects of a further developed analytic praxeology? What exactly can we deduce from a formalized fundamental axiom of praxeology? (5) Tolerance is a central tenet of the approach of the Austrian School. Karl Menger and Rudolf Carnap famously extended tolerance even to logic. What role did Hans Hahn play in the early history of the principle of logical tolerance? Is logical tolerance compatible with Ludwig Mises criticism of polylogism? Are there broader, societal consequences to be drawn from logical tolerance? (6) Otto Neurath and Ludwig Mises defended democracy with different arguments than Hans Kelsen. Are there lessons to be drawn for contemporary challenges to democracy including language barriers, the role of experts, and education?