Regionalization and Internationalization

Beginning in the 1950s, increased regional self-consciousness in Tyrol and considerable efforts at emancipation of the South Tyroleans political elite from Vienna, Trento, and Rome became noticeable. These laid down the track from the regionalization of this European minority conflict to an internationalization and marked the beginning of the formation of a South Tyrolean identity. Against the background of growing pressure from Innsbruck and Bolzano and the increasing mobilization of culturally-conscious lobbies in North and South Tyrol, the Ballhausplatz diplomats succeeded in bringing its stalled South Tyrol policy out of its shell, in beginning bilateral exploratory discussions with Italy, and, after their fruitless results, daring to bring the issue before the United Nations (UN). Within the framework of a multilevel system, the increasing polarization between Bolzano and Trento and the tense relationship with Rome at the domestic Italian level are investigated. The "re-option" issue (the return of South Tyrolean emigrants from Austria and Germany) functioned as a countermeasure at the bilateral level between Vienna and Rome to Italy`s policy of resettling ethnic Italians in South Tyrol. At the international level, the smoldering Trieste crisis 1953-54 and the solving of the Saar conflict 1955/56 were the stimulus for tendencies toward regionalization, whereby the leadership of the South Tyrolean People`s Party (SVP) attempted to maintain the balance between self-determination as a means of pressure and legitimate efforts at autonomy. Files from the Austrian State Archives in Vienna, the Tyrolean Provincial Archives in Innsbruck, and completely new material from the archives of the SVP serve as the basis for this two volume editorial project.

If South Tyrol is to serve as an example of resolution, then its function as a model lay in the normalization of bilateral relations and settlement at the bilateral level. Repeated attempts at internationalization ended with bilateralization, and thus the efforts at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference and the involvement of the United Nations from 1959 to 1961 ended up with the dispute before the UN being declared settled in 1992. The regulations contained in the Paris Agreement and its inclusion in the Italian peace treaty were merely "taken note of" by the signatory states. They were not compelled to intervene, and there also was no Italian obligation toward them. There could be no question of an international guarantee of the rights of the South Tyroleans, but there could be a discussion of a grounding in international law. The signatory states of the peace treaty did not publicly or officially complain about a possible non-fulfillment of the Paris Agreement. Although they followed the matter of concern with goodwill, they did not actively stand up for South Tyrol. The hand held by Austria, North Tyrol, and South Tyrol continued to be a strong one. The only "guarantee" was the "goodwill" of Italy. But in the 1940s and 1950s, there was not much to observe of the oft-cited "spirit of Paris". With Gruber`s resignation in 1953 and the death of De Gasperi in 1954, the signers of the Paris Agreement, and along with them, the personal guarantors of the agreement, were out of the political picture. Their successors seemed to no longer attach such importance to the "gentleman`s agreement". South Tyrol also had varying levels of importance for Austria`s foreign policy. It only had priority at too few points in time or during brief periods, for example, in 1945-46 and in the years 1959-61, 1967, 1969, and 1991-92. For broad stretches of time, it was subordinate to other issues. The Paris Agreement was not only an expression of bilateralization (a reoption settlement) but especially one of an internal Italianization of the conflict (regulation of autonomy). Only the continuing frustration about the solution that had remained unsatisfactory on the part of the South Tyroleans (1947-51) and the growing regionalization of the issue (1952/53-1958) created the preconditions for an actual internationalization of the problem through the involvement of the United Nations (1959-61) which, through recommendations for resolutions, once again led to bilateralization in 1961 and, through the involvement of the "Commission of Nineteen", once again resulted in an internal Italianization (1961-64). The policy of neutrality conducted by Austria - which, in contrast to that of Switzerland, was carried out in an offensive manner (UN membership in 1955, joining the Council of Europe in 1956, humanitarian and political engagement in the Hungarian crisis of 1956-57, etc.) - allowed for considerable scopes of action. To the disappointment of Rome, neutrality did not represent an obstacle for the South Tyrol policy. Through the human rights dimension of the Kreiskyian neutrality policy, Austria`s foreign policy status experienced a particular tone from which a special legitimation was derived to "actively" stand up for the matters of concern of the South Tyroleans.