Intentionality and Symbolic Construction

One of the more curious aspects of the development of 20th century philosophy is the infamous analytic/continental-divide. Although there are growing doubts about its philosophical significance, the analytic/continental-split continues to shape the face of professional philosophy. In many areas the reality is still that philosophers who associate themselves with one tradition tend to ignore the other. This state of mutual ignorance is particularly noticeable in philosophy of science, where influences from outside the well-established canon of analytic philosophy are even scarcer than in other fields. A central assumption underlying the planned research project is that continental philosophy does not play a relative minor role in philosophy of science because of shortcomings that are intrinsic to its methodological outlook. At least in part, its relative absence is rather to be explained in terms of external factors such as the catastrophic political events that swept across Europe in the first half of the 20th century. A major aim of the planned research project is to substantiate this thesis by offering a critical reconstruction of a still understudied approach to science that lies outside the trajectory of analytic philosophy and thatpartly for this very reasondid not gain the traction needed to establish itself as a real factor in philosophy of science. The approach in question is due to Hermann Weyl (1885-1955). Although not too well known in philosophical circles, Weyl is a towering figure in the history of 20 th century mathematics and physics. Yet, there are reasons why Weyl deserves not only historical, but also philosophical attention. First, one would be hard pressed to find a scientist of Weyls stature who invested more effort into reflecting on the nature of scientific cognition from a philosophical point of view. Second, when looking at his philosophy from a contemporary perspective, one can easily agree with Thomas Ryckmans observation that Weyl wrote more like a continental than an analytic about mathematics and science. Although Weyl never offered a systematic account of his philosophical views, the ideas contained in his writings are what come closest to a genuinely continental philosophy of science. The planned research project proceeds from the assumption that Weyls writings contain several more or less developed ideas towards a philosophy of science that is firmly rooted within the framework of Edmund Husserls phenomenology. The main objective of the research project is to identify and critically evaluate these ideas, and to turn them into a systematic whole. Ideally, the final outcome of the project will be the outline of a genuinely phenomenological philosophy of science that opens up new ways to think about the nature of science and scientific cognition.

The aim of this research project was to investigate the viability of a genuinely phenomenological perspective on the natural sciences in general and physics in particular, based on the work of the mathematician, physicist and philosopher Hermann Weyl. Historically, this question is well founded, as Hermann Weyl was in contact with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, during his time in Göttingen and, according to his own statements, was strongly influenced by his philosophy. It is known, for example, that Weyl's discovery of the principle of gauge symmetry was closely related to phenomenological considerations. The influence of phenomenological philosophy on Weyl's thinking is also clearly recognizable in other areas of his work, such as his understanding of the fundamentals of mathematical representation and the nature of coordinate systems. Building on these historical findings, the project team members Philipp Berghofer and Harald Wiltsche have succeeded in establishing phenomenology as a lively and forward-looking alternative within contemporary philosophy of physics. However, the work within the framework of this research project was by no means limited to the historical examination of Hermann Weyl: several international conferences and workshops were organized, which offered physicists and philosophers the opportunity either to familiarize themselves with the methods of phenomenology or to apply them to different areas of physics research. The broad impact of the project is reflected in a large number of publications, including articles, handbook entries, a monograph, two edited volumes in renowned international series and a special issue in one of the leading journals in the field of philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. A key outcome of the project was the realization that a phenomenological perspective on physics research can reveal results that go far beyond the narrow field of philosophy of physics. Phenomenology aims to analyze different ways of relating to the world in their respective peculiarities and not to advocate a one-sided absolutization, but to demonstrate the compatibility between life-world and scientific world views. This basic attitude, which runs through Hermann Weyl's work and can also be found in other phenomenologically inspired philosophers and mathematicians such as Fritz London or Gian-Carlo Rota, seems more important than ever in a time of increasing social polarization. It is also positive that the research project was able to make a decisive contribution to the internationalization of a genuinely phenomenological perspective within the philosophy of physics. On a personal level, it should be emphasized that both researchers involved in the project completed several stays abroad in the USA. In addition, the networks that emerged from this project, which enabled numerous follow-up activities such as conferences, publications and third-party funded projects, are characterized by a high degree of geographical, cultural and intellectual diversity.