Incompatibilism, Intensionality and Hyperintensionality

Can human beings truly have free will if our actions are already determined by past events, natural laws, or even divine knowledge? For centuries, philosophers have debated this question, which lies at the heart of how we understand responsibility, morality, and choice. This project investigates the logical foundations of these debates. The projects central idea is that the success of classic incompatibilist argumentsthose claiming that free will cannot coexist with determinism or divine foreknowledgedepends on whether a certain logical operator, expressing that something is beyond our control, behaves in a particular way. The project asks: what must be true about the logic of no choice for these arguments to succeed? By applying modern tools from formal logic and the philosophy of language, the project explores how our concepts of necessity, possibility, and ability interact. It introduces a new and general approach: rather than asking what free will is, or what free choice consists in, it asks how the logic of choice should work, however we define this concept. This formal and abstract perspective could reshape longstanding debates in philosophy about freedom, moral responsibility, and human agency. Through several research papers, international conferences, and collaborations, the project will contribute to a deeper understanding of how reasoning about free will connects with broader questions about logic, meaning, and human responsibility. Its findings aim to clarify not only an ancient philosophical puzzle but also how we think about decision-making and accountability today.